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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 930286-CA

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of theft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) in
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Judge's Hypothetical Comment. Did the trial judge's

hypothetical oral comment that if he had not arrested judgment he
would have granted a new trial constitute an order binding upon a
successor trial judge?

Insofar as this issue presents a question

of law# the trial court's decision is reviewable for correctness.
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).
2.

Intent to Deprive. Did the trial court err in instructing

the jury that defendant could be found guilty of theft if he formed
the purpose to deprive after gaining control of the subject property?
"Determining the propriety of the instructions submitted to the jury

presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court's
instructions under a correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas,
846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993).

This Court will "review jury

instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah
App. 1992).
3.

Good Faith Instruction. Did the trial court err in

denying defendant's requested good faith instruction whose substance
was covered by other instructions? See standard of review for issue
No. 2.
4.

Limited Partnership Property. Is defendant bound by

this Court's prior consideration and rejection of his claim that he
is entitled to an acquittal because the property he embezzled belonged
to the limited partnership, not the limited partners?

This issue

does not require this Court to review any ruling of the trial court.
5.

Prior Conviction of Securities Fraud. Did defendant's

prior conviction on 18 counts of securities fraud constitute conviction
of a crime involving "dishonesty or false statement" for purposes
of rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence?

This issue presents a

question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 781 n.3.
6.

Evidence of Motive. Did the trial court abuse its

discretion in permitting a prosecution witness to testify concerning
the State's investigation of other securities violations by Granada,

2

Inc.? A trial court's rule 403 ruling will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. An appellate
court will "review the trial court's 403 ruling admitting or denying
admission to evidence by deciding whether, as a matter of law, the
trial court's decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of
the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was
beyond the limits of reasonability.,f

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d

232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (bracketed language in original; citation
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2):
(a) General rule. For the purpose
attacking the credibility of a witness,

of

(1) evidence that a witness other than the
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which the witness
was convicted, and evidence that an accused has
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted
if the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with theft, a second degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 1729-30) . After a trial,
the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 1876).
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment or, in the
alternative, for a new trial (R. 1911-12).

Judge Russon entered a

written order arresting judgment on the ground that "the facts proved
or admitted at trial do not constitute a public offense" (R. 2005-07,
Addendum B) . He orally commented, "if my ruling had been otherwise,
I would have granted a new trial . . . "

(Addendum A at 110). The

State appealed from the order, and this Court reversed the trial court
and remanded the case for reinstatement of the jury verdict and
sentencing. State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 591-92 (UtahApp.) cert.
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (Larsen I) (Addendum C).
On remand, Judge Murphy sentenced defendant to the statutory
term and imposed restitution in an amount to be determined by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole. He imposed no fine. He
also stayed defendant's prison sentence and placed him on 36-month
probation (R. 2277-78).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case were concisely stated by this Court
in Larsen I, 834 P.2d at 587-88:
In 1971, defendant formed a corporation known
as Granada, Inc., which developed real estate
primarily through the partnerships and limited
partnerships it created. Defendant served as
president of Granada and, along with members of
his family, owned the corporation.
4

In 1979, Granada created Three Crowns Ltd.,
a limited partnership, and sold limited partnership interests to a number of investors. Three
Crowns then purchased a mobile home park in Las
Vegas, Nevada.
Defendant was one of three
general partners in Three Crowns and in 1980,
Granada became the acting general partner.
In 1986, when Granada began experiencing a
serious cash flow problem, members of Granada's
executive committee met regularly to discuss and
attempt to remedy the problem. The committee
discussed selling the Three Crowns property, but
did not decide to sell it. On October 10, 1986,
defendant sold the property without telling any
of the members of Granada's executive committee,
and deposited the proceeds of $1,073,000 into
the Three Crown's bank account. Defendant drew
a check for $600,000 on the account, deposited
it in Granada's Interoffice Account, and
transferred $500,000 to an account for Utah
Mortgage Fund, a proposed securities offering
by Granada that would allow Granada to bring in
additional investment money.
By October 23, 1986, defendant had transferred all the proceeds of the sale of the Three
Crowns property to Granada's accounts without
the knowledge either of Granada's executive
committee members or the limited partners of
Three Crowns, who were the alleged victims of
the theft. Granada's books listed the proceeds
as loans, but no payments were ever made to Three
Crowns. The State's expert testified at trial
that in March 1986, Granada was already insolvent
"to the tune of $20 million," which condition
worsened with time.
Limited partners of Three Crowns, including
Ned Gregerson and Neil Mortenson, learned of the
sale of the partnership property, asked defendant
to distribute their shares to them, and instructed defendant on how they wanted theirs shares
of the proceeds to be reinvested. Defendant never
distributed the shares to them. Limited partner
John Chamberlain requested a cash distribution,
but only received a lesser valued interest in
another mobile home park, despite defendant's
assurances that he would receive the money.

5

Robert Nelson, another limited partner, also did
not receive a requested distribution.
In January 1987, Granada's executive
committee and lower management determined that
Granada had a negative net worth of between $3
to $7 million. Granada filed for bankruptcy.
Defendant then made several disbursements of the
proceeds from the sale of the Nevada property,
but none to the limited partners named above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Judge Russon's comment that he would have ordered a

new trial had he not arrested judgment did not constitute an order
binding upon his successor judge for several reasons. First, it is
apparent on the face of Judge Russon's comment that it is not an order.
Second, any ambiguity in the trial judge's oral statement was cured
in his written order, which makes no mention of a new trial. Third,
Judge Russon's order arresting judgment and purportedly acquitting
defendant mooted defendant's motion for a new trial and rendered any
"ruling" on it similarly moot. Fourth, this Court implicitly rejected
defendant's argument on his first appeal. Finally, on appeal defendant
does not defend the substance of Judge Russon's comment.
2.

Defendant waived his objection to the jury instruction

on intent by failing to preserve it below. Nevertheless, the trial
court properly instructed the jury that defendant could be found guilty
of theft if he formed the purpose to deprive after gaining control
of the subject property. Utah's theft statute incorporates numerous
common law crimes, including embezzlement. The essence of embezzlement
is that the actor converts property he lawfully acquired.
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Hence,

it is not necessary for a defendant to harbor the intent to deprive
when he receives the property.
3.

Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim based

on his proffered good faith jury instruction. Moreover, the substance
of the instruction was thoroughly covered in other jury instructions.
4.

a. Defendant argues in effect that he should have been

acquitted because the evidence at trial showed that he embezzled
property belonging to the limited partnership and not to the limited
partners.

In Larsen I, this Court considered and rejected this

argument. See Larsen 1, 834 P.2d at 590-591. It held that "a partner
may be convicted of theft of partnership property."

Id. at 591.

It also held, "To obtain a conviction for theft, the State does not
have to prove who owned the property. . . . Thus, the distinction
defendant draws between partnership property and the property of
individual partners is not determinative." Id. (citation omitted).
Therefore, law of the case and controlling precedent preclude
relitigating this issue.
b. Defendant's claim that certain jury instructions should
have been given fails for four reasons.

First, the claim was not

preserved below. Second, the proposed instructions are not included
in the record on appeal. Third, the proposed instructions deal with
the legal status of the limited partnership, which is not at issue
in this case. And fourth, to the extent they can be understood to
bear on this case, the instructions incorrectly state the law under
Larsen_I.
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5.

Defendant's 18 counts of securities fraud were admissible

for the purpose of impeachment.
a. Rule 609(a) (2) provides that "evidence that any witness
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." The
trial court lacks discretion to exclude the evidence.
b. Also, rule 609(e) states: "The pendency of an appeal
therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible."
c. Finally, defendant's argument that securities fraud is
not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement fails.

The

unspoken premise of this argument is that misleading an investor by
omitting a material fact does not implicate one's honesty. No legal
authority supports this view; common sense belies it.
6.

Defendant failed to properly preserve his objections

to the testimony of John Baldwin that he now challenges. Mr. Baldwin
testified that at the time of the embezzlement defendant needed half
a million dollars in order to issue a securities offering necessary
to keeping his financial empire operational. On appeal, defendant
attacks that portion of Mr. Baldwin's testimony regarding the Utah
Division of Securities' concern that defendant was issuing unregistered
securities. Because Mr. Baldwin's testimony exposed defendant's motive
for the theft, it was probative. Conversely, evidence that defendant
had been investigated for issuing or attempting to issue unregistered
securities would hardly arouse and inflame the passions of a jury
to such an extent that they would decide the case on that basis.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S HYPOTHETICAL ORAL COMMENT
THAT IF HE HAD NOT ARRESTED JUDGMENT HE WOULD
HAVE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL DID NOT CONSTITUTE
AN ORDER BINDING UPON A SUCCESSOR TRIAL JUDGE
After the jury convicted defendant on the theft charge,
he moved to arrest judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Judge Russon granted defendant's motion to arrest judgment on the
ground that the facts of the case did not constitute theft (Transcript
dated Feb. 19, 1991 at 109-110) -1 The judge then stated:
But in addition to that, I do make the following
finding that in addition to that, if my ruling
had been otherwise, I would have granted a new
trial because I don't think the instruction
clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in
the element instructions.
(Id. at 110). The judge later entered a written order, prepared by
defense counsel, arresting judgment pursuant to rule 23, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and purporting to acquit defendant (R. 2005-07,
Addendum B).

The written order omits any reference to the judge's

comment quoted above.
The State appealed the order to this Court. In his brief
on appeal, defendant quoted Judge Russon's comment, calling it "an
interesting footnote" (Brief of C. Dean Larsen in Larsen I at 23,
Addendum D) . He did not characterize the comment as an "order."
Defendant then argued:

1

Defendant did not make this transcript a part of the record
on appeal. The State has copied the relevant pages from its own copy
and annexed them to this brief as Addendum A.
9

Therefore, if this Court remands this case,
the proper remedy is not to reinstate the jury
verdict, but to remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion.
If such further proceedings are allowed by this
Court in the lower court, then it is presumed
Judge Russon (or his successor) will enter an
order granting the Appellee a new trial based
upon Judge Russon's comments outlined above.
(Id. at 23-24) . Without comment on this request, this Court reversed
and remanded "for reinstatement of the jury verdict and sentencing."
Larsen I, 834 P.2d at 592.
On remand, defendant moved to reduce to writing what he
by then was calling "Judge Leonard H. Russon's Order Granting a New
Trial" (R. 2210-11).

Judge Murphy denied this motion in a signed

minute entry ruling that Judge Russon's "cryptic statement" was legally
incorrect and was not the law of the case (R. 2843-44).
On this second appeal, defendant again asserts that Judge
Russon's aside was binding upon the trial court (Brief of Appellant
[hereinafter Br. App.] 12-18) . This argument lacks merit for several
reasons.
First, it is apparent on the face of Judge Russon's comment
that it is not an order.

It should be obvious that orders are not

expressed in the subjunctive mood. The law does not enforce statements
of what a judge would have done under other circumstances. Here,
the court's purpose was merely to "catch everyone's eye so that same
instruction won't be used over again" in the event of retrial (Addendum
A at 110). Defendant's original description of the comment as a
"footnote" was thus apt.

Defendant's law-of-the-case authorities

10

are inapposite because they presuppose a prior order or ruling of
the court. See State v. Lamuer, 779 P.2d 1125, 1128-30 (Utah 1989)
(order admitting evidence) ; Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc. ,
692 P.2d 735, 736 (Uta., 1984) (denial of summary judgment motion);
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 43
(Utah App. 1988) (summary judgment).
Second, any ambiguity in the trial judge's oral statement
was cured in his written order, which makes no mention of a new trial.
Defendant's assertion that Judge Russon "resigned and left the bench
before entering a written order" (Br. App. 16) contradicts the record.
Defense counsel prepared a written order, which Judge Russon entered
(R. 2005-07, Addendum B) . Consequently, defendant's demand that Judge
Murphy "should have simply reduced Judge Russon's oral ruling to
writing" (Br. App. 14) rings hollow.
It is well settled in Utah that a trial court's "written
judgment supersedes the oral statement of the court."

Drurv v.

Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 75, 415 P.2d 662, 663 n.l (1966) . See also
State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398, 399 n.3 (Utah 1977) ("oral statements
of the trial court are superseded by the written findings, judgment,
or verdict"), overruled on other grounds. State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d
1226, 1227-28 (Utah 1979) . Assuming an inconsistency between Judge
Russon's oral statements and his written order, the latter should
govern, since

,f

[o]ral statements of opinion by the trial court

inconsistent with the findings and conclusions ultimately rendered
do not affect the final judgment." McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah
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311, 320, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952).

See also Parry v. State, 837

P.2d 998, 999 (Utah App. 1992) (written judgment controls oral order
that was ambiguous and therefore legally defective).
Third, defendant filed a "Motion in Arrest of Judgment,
or in the Alternative, For New Trial on Theft Conviction" (R. 1911-12) .
Judge Russon's order arresting judgment and purportedly acquitting
defendant mooted defendant's motion for a new trial and rendered any
"ruling" on it similarly moot. See Peay v. Peav, 607 P. 2d 841, 842
(Utah 1980) (where movant's prayer for relief is fully granted,
alternative claim is rendered moot); State v. General Oil Co., 22
Utah 2d 68, 61-62, 448 P.2d 718, 718-19 (1968) (where plaintiff sought
alternatively new trial or additur, order for new trial mooted
conditional order for additur).
Fourth, as outlined above, this Court implicitly rejected
defendant's argument on his first appeal. Inasmuch as defendant has
not demonstrated any change in relevant circumstances in the
intervening period, see Lamper, 779 P.2d at 1129, there is no reason
for this Court to revisit that holding.
Finally, on appeal defendant does not defend the substance
of Judge Russon's comment.

Judge Russon would have granted a new

trial based on his belief that the elements instruction "leaves out
a very key element and it is the element of intent" (Addendum A at
107) . However, Judge Murphy later ruled that the elements instruction
was proper (R. 2843-44), and defendant does not argue otherwise.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT DEFENDANT COULD BE FOUND GUILTY OF THEFT
IF HE FORMED THE PURPOSE TO DEPRIVE AFTER
GAINING CONTROL OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
In his Point II.A., defendant claims the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury in instruction No. 22 that, in order
to find defendant guilty of theft, it was not necessary that they
find that he formed a specific intent to deprive another of property
at the time he first obtained control over it, but that such an intent
could be found "at any period of time" (Br. App. 18-19).
In his Point III.B., defendant claims the trial court
erroneously refused defendant's proffered instruction to the opposite
effect, i.e., that the intent to steal must coincide with the taking
(Br. App. 28) . Since these claims are the obverse and converse of
the same issue, the State will treat them together.
A.

This Claim Was Not Preserved for Appeal.

Defendant lodged exceptions to instruction No. 22 and the
Court's refusal to give defendant's proffered instruction on intent
to steal (R. 2059 at 60, 63) . However, he stated no ground for these
exceptions (R. 2059 at 60-64) . Defendant's objections were therefore
insufficient to preserve these issues for appeal. "No party may assign
as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection."
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah
1987).
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Accordingly, these claims should not be considered on appeal.
B.

This Claim Lacks Merit.

Were this Court to reach these claims, it would find them
meritless. Utah's theft statute consolidates under one crime "the
separate offenses . . . heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick,
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail,
[and] receiving stolen property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1990) ;
State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472, 473 (Utah App. 1987) (citing same) ;
UtahCodeAnn. §76-6-401(4) (1990) ("obtain or exercise unauthorized
control" as used in the theft statute includes conduct "heretofore
defined or known as common-law . . . embezzlement").
The State's theory in this case was that defendant had
committed the "embezzlement" variation of theft (see State's requested
instruction at R. 1808).
At common law, embezzlement consisted of "coming into
possession of property honestly, 'by virtue of one's trust, ' and then
converting it to one's own use in violation of that trust." State
v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 109, 378 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1963) (citation
omitted). In contrast, "[w]here the intent to take the property of
another is formed before the taking, and is coupled with some deception
or trick to acquire possession of the property, the crime is not
embezzlement." Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d at 108, 378 P.2d at 353-54. The
distinction is one of intent. One commentator on the common law has
written:
The bailee who receives possession without
wrongful intent does not commit trespass by a
14

subsequent fraudulent conversion. His offense
is embezzlement and his conviction under such
a charge is proper. But if his original intent
was fraudulent his conversion is common-law
larceny.
Rollin M. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 289-90 (2d ed. 1969).
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this distinction in State
v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987) . Snyder was charged with theft
of funds he acquired from investors in a condominium project.

It

was undisputed that Snyder "lawfully obtained possession of the funds
of the investors. What was in dispute was the authority defendant
had to expend the funds entrusted to him." Id. at 419. The supreme
court affirmed Snyder's conviction on the following reasoning: (1)
defendant was charged with theft under section 76-6-404; (2) the crime
of theft includes the common law crime of embezzlement under section
76-6-401(4); and (3) according to Taylor, common law embezzlement
was committed "when one entrusted with the property of another
converted it to his or her own use."

747 P.2d at 419.

In view of the foregoing, instruction No. 22 properly
instructed the jury that it was not necessary for a conviction "that
you find that the Defendant formed such specific intent or purpose
to deprive at the time that he first obtained control over the property
of another, but such purpose to deprive may be found at any period
of time in which the defendant exercised unauthorized control over
such property" (R. 1862).2

This instruction permitted the jury to

Jury instruction No. 22 reads in its entirety:
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convict under either the larceny theory of theft or the embezzlement
theory of theft.

It was therefore a correct statement of the law.

Under defendant' s proffered instruction, in order to convict
the jury would have had to find "that the intent to steal existed
at the time of the taking of the property, and no subsequent felonious
intent will suffice" (R. 1838).3

Because this instruction would

In order to convict the defendant of the
charged offense, you must find that he exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another
while acting with the specific intent or purpose
to deprive the other person of his/her property,
as defined in these instructions.
It is not
necessary that you find that the Defendant formed
such specific intent or purpose to deprive at the
time that he first obtained control over the
property of another, but such purpose to deprive
may be found at any period of time in which the
defendant exercised unauthorized control over such
property.
(R. 1862).
3

Defendant's proffered instruction reads in its entirety:
In order to convict the Defendant of the crime
of Theft, it is necessary for you to find that the
intent to steal existed at the time of the taking
of the property, and no subsequent felonious intent
will suffice.
Therefore, if you find that at the time the
Defendant C. Dean Larsen is alleged to have obtained
or exercised unauthorized control over the property
of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson,
and Neil Mortsensen [sic] , he did not have the
intent to steal their property, no subsequent
felonious intent will suffice and you must conclude
that the State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the element of intent to commit
the crime of theft.

(R. 1838).
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have limited the crime of theft to the larceny variety, it was an
incorrect statement of the law. Defendant is not entitled to a jury
instruction that incorrectly states the law. State v. Larsen, 828
P.2d487, 495 (UtahApp.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) .
Not surprisingly, the authorities defendant cites in support
of his view are pre-code larceny cases and so inapposite here. See
Br. App. 19; State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955)
("grand larceny") ; State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84 (1920) (same) ;
People v. Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 P. 514 (1886) (same).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
PROFFERED GOOD FAITH INSTRUCTION BECAUSE ITS
SUBSTANCE WAS ADEQUATELY COVERED BY OTHER
INSTRUCTIONS
In his Point III.C., defendant claims the trial court erred
in refusing his proffered instruction on good faith. Br. App. 29-3 0.
A.

This Claim Was Not Preserved for Appeal.

Again, although defendant took exception to the Court's
refusal to give defendant's proffered instruction on good faith, he
stated no ground (R. 2059 at 64) .

His exception was therefore

insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal under rule 19(c) , Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, it should not be considered.
B.

This Claim Lacks Merit.

Were this Court to reach this claim, it would find it to
be without merit.

"While a defendant has a right to have his [or

her] theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable way, it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction
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if the point is properly covered in the other instructions." State
v. Diaz, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32 (Utah App. 1993) (citations and
quotation marks omitted, bracketed language in original).
Defendant's proffered instruction would have added nothing.
It would merely have instructed the jury that they could not find
defendant guilty if his state of mind was one of "honesty of purpose
or freedom from intention to commit theft" (R. 1842).4
The issue of honesty of purpose was better covered in
instructions No. 26 ("It is a defense to a charge of Theft that the
actor acted in the honest belief that he had the right to exercise
control over the property as he did") and No. 27 ("It is a defense
to the crime of Theft that the actor obtained or exercised control
over the property or service honestly believing that the owner, if
present, would have consented") (R. 1866-67).
The issue of "freedom from intention to commit theft" was
covered, and covered far more extensively than defendant's proffered
instruction would have done, by instructions No. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
22, 23, 24, which, read together, instruct the jury that they may

4

The proffered instruction reads in its entirety:
Good faith, as commonly used, means a belief or
state of mind denoting honesty of purpose or freedom
from intention to commit theft.
If the evidence in this case leaves you with
a reasonable doubt whether the Defendant obtained
or exercised control over the property of another
in good faith then you should find the Defendant
not guilty of Theft.

(R. 1842).
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not convict unless they find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
acted with the requisite culpable mental state (see R. 1855, 1856,
1857, 1858, 1859, 1862, 1863, 1864, Addendum E ) .
POINT IV
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED
DEPENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THE PROPERTY HE EMBEZZLED
BELONGED TO THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, NOT THE
LIMITED PARTNERS
In Point II.B. defendant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to show that he exercised unauthorized control over the
property of the four individuals named in the information and the
jury instructions (Br. App. 20-26).

The gist of this argument is

that he should have been acquitted because the evidence at trial showed
that he embezzled property belonging to the limited partnership and
not to the limited partners.

In Point III.A. defendant complains

that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on this theory (Br.
App. 26-27).
A.

Law of the Case Bars Defendant's Insufficiency Claim.

Point II.B. of defendant's brief, setting out his theory
of limited partnership law as it applies to the crime of theft, is
a cut-and-paste, virtually verbatim rewrite of his brief to this Court
in Larsen I (see generally Addendum D ) . 5

5

The second and third paragraphs on page 21 of appellant's
brief are lifted from pages 33-34 of his brief in Larsen I; the third
paragraph on page 22 is from page 28 of the earlier brief; and the
last several pages of the argument, pages 23 through 26, are lifted
whole cloth from pages 27 through 31 of the earlier brief.
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In Larsen I, this Court considered and rejected this
argument. See Larsen 1, 834 P. 2d at 590-591. It held that "a partner
may be convicted of theft of partnership property."

Id. at 591.

It also held that " [t]o obtain a conviction for theft, the State does
not have to prove who owned the property. . . • Thus, the distinction
defendant draws between partnership property and the property of
individual partners is not determinative." Id. (citation omitted) .
Accordingly, this issue has been finally decided by this
Court in a prior stage of this litigation. Defendant does not argue
that any "relevant circumstances change [d] in the intervening period,"
State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989), nor have they.
Defendant does not argue that this Court's resolution of this issue
in Larsen I was "merely dicta," DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835
P.2d 1000, 1003 (UtahApp. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993) , nor was it. Defendant does not argue that Larsen I was "clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice," State v. O'Neil, 84 8
P.2d 694, 697 (UtahApp.) (citations omitted) , cert, denied, 859 P.2d
585 (Utah 1993), nor would it.

Therefore, the doctrine of law of

the case requires this Court to follow its earlier holding. Lamper,
779 P.2d at 1129-30; Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc. , 692
P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984) ; DeBrv, 835 P.2d at 1003; O'Neil, 848 P.2d
at 697.
B.

The Jury Instruction Claim Is Waived, Barred,
and Meritless.

In his Point III.A., defendant attacks the trial court's
failure to give three of his proposed instructions (Br. App. 26-27) .
20

These instructions were intended to support defendant's theory that,
even if he did appropriate the money at issue, his act did not legally
constitute theft. Defendant's jury instruction claim fails for four
independent reasons.
First, defendant failed to preserve it by objecting and
stating a ground for his exception as required by rule 19(c), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

See R. 2056 at 59-64.

Second, two of the three requested instructions at issue
(see Br. App. 26-27) are not included in the record on appeal. An
appellate court "will not review the denial of a requested instruction
unless it is included in the record."

State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218

(Utah 1986); accord State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982) .
The third was given by the court (R. 1860) , as defendant acknowledges
(Br. App. 27), and so cannot form the basis for reversal.
Third, the two instructions that were not given are
irrelevant.

According to defendant's brief, the first states:

At the time a limited partner becomes entitled
to receive a distribution from the limited
partnership, he has the status of, and is
entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor
of the limited partnership with respect to the
distribution.
(Br. App. 26, emphasis added). According to defendant's brief, the
second states:
Where two persons create a relationship of debtor
and creditor, a failure of one of the parties
to pay over money in satisfaction of the debt
does not constitute the crime of theft.
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(Br. App. 26-27) . At most, these instructions establish that a limited
partnership cannot be guilty of theft of undistributed proceeds.
However, this prosecution was not against the limited partnership,
but against defendant.
Fourth, to the extent these instructions could be understood
to touch upon this case, they incorrectly state the law. See Larsen
I,

834 P.2d at 590-91.

A criminal defendant is not entitled to a

jury instruction that incorrectly states the law. State v. Larsen,
828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992).
The trial court properly refused to give the instructions
at issue.
POINT V
BECAUSE SECURITIES FRAUD INVOLVES DISHONESTY
OR FALSE STATEMENT, DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF
18 COUNTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD WAS ADMISSIBLE
UNDER UTAH R. EVID. 609(a)(2)
Before trial, defendant filed a written motion seeking to
exclude evidence of his conviction of 18 counts of securities fraud
(R. 1650-51).6

He cited various grounds, including rule 609, Utah

Rules of Evidence (id.) .

The trial court ruled that "there is

absolutely no question in my mind but that the prior convictions are
convictions involving dishonesty and false statement" and that, as
such, they were automatically admissible under rule 609(a)(2) (R.
2057 at 5, 7-8).

6

Judge Russon presided over both the prior securities fraud
trial and the theft trial giving rise to this appeal (R. 1650).
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Given the court's ruling, and as a matter of strategy,
defendant testified to the convictions on direct examination (R. 2056
at 92). The examination proceeded as follows:
Q
[Mr. Keller] Now, Mr, Larsen, you have
been convicted of criminal offenses before,
correct?
A

[Mr. Larsen] Yes.

Q
What have you been convicted of and
what is the status of those convictions?
A
There was one trial involving securities fraud recently of 18 counts of securities
fraud which conviction was entered.
Q
And what is the present status of that
conviction?
A
Those are on appeal to the Utah Court
of Appeals. It is a joint appeal of all 18
counts from that one trial.
(R. 2056 at 124) . Defendant now assigns error to the trial court's
admission of this evidence (Br. App. Point IV). 7
A.

The Court Lacked Discretion to Exclude
Defendant's Securities Fraud Conviction.

Rule 609(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness,

7

Defendant's references to due process are free of argument
and analysis and so add nothing to his claim. See State v. Laffertv,
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other
grounds. Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1556 (10th Cir. 1991) , cert,
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992) ("This Court will not engage in
constructing arguments out of whole cloth [even] on behalf of
defendants in capital cases").
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(2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
With respect to conviction of crimes involving dishonesty
or false statement, " [t]he mandatory language of the rule leaves the
trial court with no discretion to exclude the evidence." State v.
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989).

Accord State v. Wight, 765

P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1988) ("If honesty was involved, evidence of
the prior conviction is automatically admissible under 609(a) (2) ") .
The ruling of the trial court was thus correct.
Defendant claims that the trial court here had discretion
to exclude the evidence because the second trial was "part of the
same case as the first trial" and had the same case number (Br. App.
34) .8

8

Defendant's argument that the "State should not have been
able to have it both ways" (Br. App. 33) is ironic considering it
was defendant who urged the trial court to sever the cases. The trial
court stated:
The only argument that would be left to the defense
would be the argument that Mr. Keller has made,
"But, Judge, this is related so close and a part
of basically the same case." But it was the exact
opposite argument that Mr. Keller made in an
extensive brief and orally in this courtroom that
convinced me to sever the cases because they are
different cases and shouldn't have been filed
together at all. Should have been filed just as
separate cases. If I hadn't been convinced of
that initially, I wouldn't have severed them.
Because what Judge in the world wants to try five
different trials, when he can do them all in one?
So I was very reluctant to do that, but I was
convinced by the defense that they are separate
and probably should have even been filed as
separate cases.
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Yet defendant gives no authority for his novel view, makes
no attempt to harmonize it with the plain language of rule 609 (a) (2) ,
and makes no attempt to distinguish the controlling authorities.
Consequently, this Court should "refuse[] 'to address this issue and
assume[] the correctness of the trial court's judgment.'" State v.
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Dav, 815
P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) ) : accord State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d
960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah
1984) ; State v. Reiner, 803 P.2d at 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) ;
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App.
P. 24(d) (9) .
Since this claim is neither "warranted by existing law"
nor "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law," it is frivolous. Utah R. App. P. 33(b).
B.

The Pendency of am Appeal Is Irrelevant.

Defendant argues that allowing impeachment based on
convictions then on appeal constituted reversible error (Br. App.
34-35) .
Rule 609(e) states: "The pendency of an appeal therefrom
does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible."9 Defendant
argues that this rule was not intended to apply

"under the

(R. 2057 at 7). It is defendant who wants it both ways.
9

The rule continues: "Evidence of the pendency of an appeal
is admissible." Evidence of the pendency of the appeal was admitted
at defendant's trial (R. 2056 at 124).
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circumstances of this individual case" (Br. App. 35) . Again, defendant
cites no authority for this claim.
Since this claim is neither "warranted by existing law"
nor "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law," it is frivolous. Utah R. App. P. 33(b).
C.

The Crime of Securities Fraud Involves
Dishonesty or False Statement.

Defendant argues that his conviction of 18 counts of
securities fraud does not constitute conviction of a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement (Br. App. 35-36) .
For each count on which the jury convicted defendant of
securities fraud it found that he willfully made " [a]n untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading" (R. 1255).10
Pointing to the second branch of this definition, defendant
argues that the jury may not have found that he made false statements,
but rather statements which, because he willfully omitted a material
fact, were misleading (Br. App. 36) . The unspoken premise of this
argument is that misleading an investor by willfully omitting a
material fact does not implicate one's honesty.

Put more plainly

still, defendant contends that he committed honest fraud.

10

This jury instruction appears in a volume of the record
currently on file with the Utah Supreme Court in connection with
defendant's petition for certiorari. For the convenience of this
Court, it is annexed to this brief as Addendum F.
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Not surprisingly, defendant cites no authority for the
proposition that securities fraud is not a crime involving dishonesty
or false statement. Nor should it surprise that fraud is precisely
the sort of crime to which rule 609(a) (2) was intended to apply:
By the phrase 'dishonesty and false statement'
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud. embezzlement, or false pretense, or any
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
Bruce, 779 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 438, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (in turn quoting H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
C.C.A.N. 7051, 7098, 7103)). Accord State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292,
294 (Utah Ct. 1990) ("Rule 609(a) (2) was drafted to restrict automatic
admissibility to those crimes which are committed by means of deceit
or fraud and thus bear directly on a witness's tendency to offer
untruthful testimony").
Since this claim is neither "warranted by existing law"
nor "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law," it is frivolous. Utah R. App. P. 33(b).
POINT VI
DEFENDANT FAILED TO INTERPOSE TIMELY,
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO BALDWIN'S TESTIMONY;
BUT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING IT IN ANY EVENT
Defendant assigns error to the admission of that portion
of the testimony of John Baldwin, a prosecution witness, appearing
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on pages 111 and 112 of the transcript volume designated R. 2057 (Br.
App. 44-45) . (For the court's reference, the entire direct examination
of Mr. Baldwin is annexed to this brief as Addendum G.) On appeal,
defendant asserts that admission of this testimony violated rules
403 and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. App. 45)- 11
Mr. Baldwin testified that in 1985 he was with the office
of the Utah Attorney General, which at that time was concerned about
Granada, Inc. (R. 2057 at 110-11).

His examination continued:

Q
(By Mr. Griffin [the prosecutor] ) : Mr.
Baldwin, do you recall that one of the issues
that you were looking at or the division was
looking at was the sale of unregistered securities?
A
Q
Granada?

Yes, that is correct.
Do you recall how that was related to
Can you explain that a little?

A
Well, there was, to my recollection,
several entities which I would recall are
satellites around Granada. That Granada was an
operation in which money was going. There were
other entities in which money was coming and
going, and that collectively we will refer to
that group as Granada because that essentially
was the mother ship. We were again concerned
that certain of these sales of promissory notes,
securities, other types of instruments constituted unregistered securities which had not been
registered and that was the basis of the
discussions that we had with Granada.

11

Defendant's references to due process are free of argument
and analysis and so add nothing to his claim. State v. Laffertv.
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other
grounds, Laffertv v. Cook. 949 F.2d 1546, 1556 (10th Cir. 1991) , cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992) ("This Court will not engage in
constructing arguments out of whole cloth [even] on behalf of
defendants in capital cases").
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Q
Can you recall the magnitude of the
amount of money that was invested in these
unregistered securities?
MR. KELLER: Objection. I think there is an
improper foundation for that, Your Honor. He
is asking the witness to recollect something from
his memory that is specific, and I think it is
inappropriate.
THE COURT: That can be answered yes or no,
if he knows.
Q
(By Mr. Griffin) Do you recall the
amounts of money that were involved in the
division's investigation?
A
It was millions of dollars.
My
recollection is, as well as that, in order to
reconcile the negotiations and to provide an
offering statement to our satisfaction to keep
the operation ongoing, that collectively was $15
million.
(R. 2057 at 111-12) . Defense counsel later interposed a reB.-erva.Tice
objection, which was sustained (R. 2057 at 113). After a second
objection (no ground stated) , the court, outside the presence of the
jury, inquired as to the relevance of this line of questioning (R.
2057 at 113-14).
Its relevance was as follows: Defendant intended to issue
a new offering, called the Utah Mortgage Fund, for the purpose of
raising $15 million. His objective in raising the money was twofold:
first, to keep the Granada-related entities in business; and second,
through a rescission offering, to make additional disclosures to
previous investors and to permit them to withdraw their money from
other Granada entities (R. 2057 at 114, 119-20).
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The initial question was whether the offering was a security:
the State believed it was; Granada claimed it was not. However, the
State's concern ran deeper. Because Granada was known to be strapped
for cash, the Utah Division of Securities would not permit the offering
to go forward without an escrow account funded with $500,000 to be
held against the rescission offering. Defendant met this need for
cash by diverting proceeds of the sale of Three Crowns Limited
Partnership--proceeds that defendant was then on trial for embezzling
(R. 2057 at 114-15).

In sum, Baldwin's testimony established

defendant's motive.
In addition, the prosecutor argued that "we keep on hearing
Mr. Keller accuse the State of putting Granada into bankruptcy. The
jury is entitled to know why the State did that" (R. 2057 at 115) .
The court ruled that the prosecutor could proceed with the
examination so long as "we make sure we keep on the track so we don't
get too far afield" (R. 2057 at 118).
A.

The Rule 404 Claim Was Not Preserved for
Appeal.

Other than one foundational objection, defendant interposed
no contemporaneous objection to the testimony he now challenges on
appeal, which appears on pages 111 and 112 of the transcript. The
transcript indicates that defendant did object to testimony appearing
on page 113 as "irrelevant and immaterial"; the court sustained the
objection. After defendant's second relevance objection, the court
held the conference summarized above (R. 2057 at 113) . In the course
of that conference, on page 117 of the transcript, defendant reasserted
30

his relevance objection and objected for the first time under rule
403, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 2057 at 117) . At no time did defendant
object to any portion of Mr. Baldwin's testimony under rule 404 (R.
2057 at 108-28).
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103 (a) requires 'a clear and definite
objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for appeal."
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah) , cert, denied, 493 U.S.
814 (1989) . Objections to "questions in improper form, assuming facts
not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and immaterial evidence, and
asking for evidence which, although relevant, should have been excluded
under Rule 4 03" are insufficient to preserve a rule 404 issue for
appeal.

State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah

granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).

App.), cert.

Such objections "do not call

the court's attention to impermissible character evidence and the
theory is not clear from the context."

Id.12

Hence, defendant's rule 404 claim was not preserved for
appeal.

12

Even if this Court were the reach the rule 404 issues, it
would find no merit. Rule 404(b) expressly provides that while
11
[e] vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith," it "may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive . . . "
The testimony at issue here had little tendency to prove
that defendant acted in conformity with his bad character, but it
clearly established his need for immediate cash, and hence his motive
to embezzle from the limited partnership. "Although a judge has
discretion in ruling on relevancy, that discretion should be exercised
with considerable liberality when the issue is motive because a wide
latitude of evidence is relevant and hence admissible to prove motive."
State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted) .
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B.

The Rule 403 Claim Was Not Preserved for
Appeal and It Lacks Merit.

The testimony at issue here was admitted without objection
under rule 403 (see R. 2057 at 111-12) . Five transcript pages later,
defendant objected to subsequent but related testimony under rule
403.

He did not seek a mistrial, a curative instruction, jury

admonition, or an order to strike the testimony he now challenges
(R. 2057 at 117).
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling admitting evidence
unless "a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record."
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1).

"Where there [is] no clear or specific

objection on the basis of character evidence or unfair prejudice and
the specific ground for objection [is] not clear from the context
of the question or the testimony, the theory cannot be raised on
appeal."

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 495 (quoting State v. Schreuder. 726

P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)) (bracketed language in original).13
Accordingly, since no timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record here, defendant cannot raise his rule 4 03 theory
on appeal.

However, should this Court deem defendant's objection

to relate back to the challenged testimony, it should reject his rule
4 03 claim as without merit.
A trial court's rule 403 ruling will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3

13

Note that under these authorities, context may substitute
for a statement of "the specific ground for objection," but not for
the objection itself.
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(Utah 1991). An appellate court will "review the trial court's 403
ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding whether,
as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the unfairly
prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh]
its probativeness' was beyond the limits of reasonability."

State

v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (insertion in original;
citation omitted).
Here, as set forth above, John Baldwin's testimony was
probative of defendant's motive, which in turn was probative of his
guilt. Obviously, all else being equal, a person whose business empire
depends upon depositing half a million dollars in an escrow account
is more likely to embezzle a large amount of money than a person with
no such need.
On the other hand, the danger of unfair prejudice here was
negligible. The advisory committee's note to federal rule 403 states
in part, "'Unfair prejudice' within this context means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one." 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret
A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 403--3 (1993). That defendant had
been investigated for issuing or attempting to issue unregistered
securities is hardly the type of evidence that would present a risk
"that the jury's passions would be inflamed," State v. Branch, 743
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) , to such an extent that jurors would decide
the case on that basis. Moreover, defendant challenges only a fraction
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of Mr. Baldwin's testimony. Excluding that portion would have had
little effect on the trial as a whole.
The trial court's ruling admitting the evidence was safely
within the "limits of reasonability." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40.
CONCLUSION
Based on the record on appeal and the applicable law, the
State respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on November /7U, 1992.
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placef the normal thing that happens is the partners are
madder than heck and they sue the general partner
personally for personal liability for mismanagement,
probably fraud, seeking tripple damages and that is the
remedy that comes about.
never seek —

And probably the reason we

Probably the reason we have no cases

presented here of any authority of this constituting a
crime is because it is always through civilly.

But the

State in this case chose to treat it as a theft and I
have agonized over it myself.
There is another problem with this case and it
is a problem that all of us have overlooked.

And if you

will remember when we put together what I have always
considered the germ of all the Jury instructions, the key
to the jury instructions, it is the element instruction,
the most important one because it is the one that —

we

can tell the Jury a lot of things in instructions. We
can talk all about different concepts and defenses and
define "willful intent.M

We do all of these things, but

when we finally come down to the —

finally come down to

the instruction that we know that Jury is going into that
jury room and that is the one we are going to really live
by, it is the one that tells the Jury, "Before you can
convict the defendant you must find each and every one of
the following," and then we number them 1, 2, 3» 4, 5, 6.
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And then our paragraph after that says, "If you believe
that the evidence establishes each and all of the
foregoing beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to
find the defendant guilty."
Mow, the State gave us element instructions,
Requested Instructions and the defense gave us element
instructions.

And if you will remember, I think we

merged some things.

Some wording was charged.

I can't

remember which of you prepared the new instruction that
was presented.

But the new instruction that was

presented leaves out a very key element and it is the
element of intent.
The instructions that this Court gave stated as
follows:

"Before you can convict the defendant of the

crime of theft, as alleged in the Information, you must
find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the foregoing elements of that crime.

(1) That the

defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control (2)
over the property of John Chamberlain, Med Gregerson,
Robert Nelson or Neil Mortensen, (3) with a purpose to
deprive them thereof.

(4) On or about October 10 —

Wait a minute, I have got the wrong one.
Let me start over again.

"

I am sorry.

I have read from one of your

Requested instead of the one I gave.
This is the one the Court gave:

"Before you
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1

I can convict the defendant of the crime of theft as

2

I alleged in the Information, you must find from the

3

I evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following

4

I elements of that crime:

5

I unauthorized control (2) over the property of John

6

I Chamberlain, Ned Gregereon, Robert Nelson or Neil

7

J Mortensen (3) with a purpose to deprive them thereof (4)

8

J on or about October 10, 1986, (5) in Salt Lake County,

9

I State of Utah (6) and that the value of the said property

10

(1) that the defendant exercised

exceeded $1,000."

11

I

12

I establishes each and all of the foregoing elements beyond

13

I

14

Then we say, "If you believe that the evidence

a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the
defendant guilty of theft."

15

I

16

I

We did not instruct them that he did this with
intent.

17

MR. PARRISH:

18

I did.

19

I thereof."

20

I

THE COURT: That doesn't do it.

21

I

MR. PARRISH:

22

I middle state for the crime of theft.

23

Element three

Well, Your Honor, I think you

"with a purpose to deprive them

It does because that is the

THE COURT: No, it isn't.

24

I

MR. PARRISH:

It is a specific intent and the

25

I Courts have interpreted it that way.
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1
2

THE COURT: Well, I don't think it does. I
I think you have to instruct them.
M

3

You have to say

intent."

4

I

5

I I am going to grant the defense's motion.

6

I Arrest Judgment.

7

I charges that were brought.

8

I the trial as I observed it.

9

However, be that as it may, be that as it may,
I am going to

I have never felt good about these
I have never felt good during

I believe that this is a civil matter.

I think

10

I that the argument that has been made is basically set to

11

I rest by State vs. Burton. That the facts are somewhat

12

I similar. That this is really basically a civil matter.

13

I

14

I already given Mr. Larsen my lecture when I sentenced him

15

I on the securities fraud.

16

I what was done here was a very bad thing, destructive on

17

I people, that's morally wrong.

18

I exists in the civil courts for fraud and for civil

19

I action, and that what has gone on here does not

20

I constitute theft.

21

I find a case anyplace in this United States, or all 50

22

I states and all the Supreme Courts and Courts of Appeal

23

I and Federal Courts of Appeal. There is not one case that

24

I can be brought here to show that these particular facts

25

I can constitute theft, and I don't believe that they

I don't condone what has been done.

I have

I still feel that way.

I feel

But the remedy that exists

I think that is the reason we do not
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constitute theft in this particular case.

So I therefore

grant the Motion in Arrest of Judgment.
The State has a right to appeal this by statute
and I fully expect they will appeal it.

But in addition

to that, I do make the following finding that in addition
to that, if my ruling had been otherwise, I would have
granted a new trial because I don't think the instruction
clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in the
element instructions.

I think you can do something with

a purpose but I am not sure that that constitutes intent
as required by the statute and defined earlier in the
statute of a specific intent to deprive.

And 1 may be

wrong in that, but that would be the second prong and I
only mention that because if this does go on appeal, Mr.
Parrish, you should be able to appeal that as well.
MR. PARRISH:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

So that if it is reversed, when it

comes back that will catch everyone's eye so that same
instruction won't be used over again.

And then you try

it again, and then you end up going back to the Court of
Appeals again.

That is a waste of resources and

everyone's time.
that regard.

So that is the reason I am ruling in

Okay, anything further?

MR. KELLER:

Your Honor, there is one

additional procedural element under Rule 23. Will the
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OO0OO—
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT
AND ENTERING JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL

Plaintiff,
v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,

Case No. 891900927
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
—ooOoo

The above-entitled natter came before me, the Honorable Leonard
H. Russon, on February 19, 1991, for hearing on Defendant's Motion
to Arrest Judgment pursuant to Rule 23 U.R.Cr.P. or in the
alternative for a new trial pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.Cr.P. The State
was represented by Robert N. Parrish, Esq., and Defendant was present
and represented by his attorney, Larry R. Keller, Esq.
The Motions aforementioned were made with respect to the charge
of Theft, one of 42 charges contained in the Information originally
filed in the above-entitled matter, and which was tried before the
Court December 4 through 13, 1990. Said trial resulted in a jury

1

oortoos

verdict of guilty.

This Court set the date of February 19, 1991,

for potential sentencing on the Theft conviction as well as the
hearing on Defendant Larsen9s Motions aforementioned.

After

reviewing memoranda of counsel, hearing oral arguments related to
the aforementioned Motions, and good cause appearing, this Court
finds that the facts proved or admitted at trial do not constitute
a public offense; and therefore good cause exists to arrest judgment
in the above-entitled matter and enter a judgment of acquittal.
Specifically, the Court finds that the facts proved at trial,
may conceivably give rise to civil liability on the part of the
Defendant, but such facts do not constitute the public offense of
Theft as contained in the Amended Information or any other public
offense.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The Court declines to enter judgment on the jury verdict

of guilty of Theft as contained in the Amended Information and
arrests judgment in this matter pursuant to Rule 23 U.R.Cr.P.;
2.

The Court enters a judgment of acquittal In favor of

Defendant Larsen on the offense of Theft, as charged in the Amended
Information.

2

OQ£O0S

DATED this

4^7ay of

^ % ^ W , 1991.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered on this 26th day of February, 1991,
to:
Robert N. Parrish
Assistant Attorney General
•
36 South State Street, Suite 1100/
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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provides: "A contract for tale of goods
may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including eonduet by
both parti* which recognizes the existenee of euch a contract" te (emphasis
added).

ni.

CONCLUSION

The trial court properly determined that
no contract existed between Hughes and
Quintek since there was never a meeting of
the minds between the parties as to the
material terms of the contract Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that no
contract existed between Hughes and Quintek.

[4] Specifically, Hughes contends th*t
the following conduct established a coi*.
tract between Hughes and Quintek: (1) J*,
eobsen went to Hughes and requested a
contract, (2) Hughes prepared a supplier's
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
agreement based on the terms of Quintek1*
bid, (3) Hughes delivered the supplier's
[O IttTMUMItRSYSTiM,
agreement to Quintek, (4) Hughes gav e
Quintek a single set of plans, (5) Quintek
maintained a progress log for the project,
(6) Quintek delivered a single shop drawing
to Hughes, and (7) Hughes and Quintek
maintained commuwcsti&jy regarding the
design of the trusses.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
The above conduct is no more indicative
v.
of the parties' mutual recognition of a conC Dean LARSEN, Defendant
tract than it is of the parties' concerted
and Appellee.
efforts to reach an agreement for the sup.
ply of trusses for the project Further
No. f 10243-CA.
more, Hughes ignores critical facts that
Court of Appeals of Utah.
demonstrate that Quintek never acknow}.
edged the existence of a contract SpecifiJune 5, 1992.
cally, Hughes overlooks the fact that Quintek rejected Hughes's supplier's agreement; that Quintek did not begin fabricatGeneral partner was charged with
ing the trusses; and that Quintek, in Feb. theft of partnership property, and the
ruary 1984, attempted to make a new offer Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
to supply the trusses for the project Be. Leonard H. Ruason, J., granted defendant's
cause the conduct of Quintek and Hughes motion for arrest of judgment and entry of
does not demonstrate the recognition of * Judgment of acquittal. The Court of Apcontract as required by section 70A-2- peals, Bench, PJ., held that (1) trial
204(1), we conclude that a contract was not court's ruling waa arrest of judgment, and
formed under that section.
not acquittal, that state had right to appeal;
Therefore, because Hughes has failed t<> (2) partner may be convicted of theft of
establish an underlying agreement pursu. partnership property, and (8) whether genant to section 70A-2-204U), we cannot eral partner had exercised unauthorized
reach Hughes's section 70A-2-207 argu. control over partnership property which he
ment relating to different and additional secretly told was question for jury.
terms.1
Reversed and remanded.
X Even were we toreachHughes's section TQAv
2-207 daim, Hughes's delivery of the supplier**
agreement would not operate as a valid accept,
ance under that taction. That section invali.
states an acceptance if it I s expressly madt
conditional on assent to the additional terms,w
The evidence at trial was that when Hughe*
delivered the supplier's agreement to Jacobean,

Hughes told him that If he was going » do the
job, he would have to sign that agreement
Since Hughes's acceptance was conditioned on
assent to the additional or different terms contained in the supplier's agreement, the agreement did not constitute a valid acceptance to
Quintek's offer under that section.

STATE v. LARSEN

Utah 5 8 7

>(lte*App. 1912)

L Criminal U w #»1024(5)
State may not appeal valid acquittal no
natter how overwhelming the evidence
against defendant may be. U.CA.1953,
TM8a-l.

t. Criminal U w *»43
Existence of civil remedy does not excuse criminal conduct

10. Larceny *»6SU)
Whether general partner had exercised
1 Criminal U w e»1024(l)
"unauthorized control9' over partnership
Court of Appeals looks to substance of property by secretly selling it without intower court's riding, and not to the label forming other partners waa question for
attached by judge, to determine whether jury in theft prosecution.
ruling is one that state may appeal.
U.CJL1953, 77-18a-l.
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. ThompI Criminal Law *»1024(5)
son, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appelRuling that constitutes a factual reso- lant
lution in favor of defendant on one or more
Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for dedements of offense charged is an "acquit- fendant and appellee.
tal," which state may not appeal. U.CA.
1953, 77-18a-l.
Before BENCH, GARFF, and ORME, JJ.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
OPINION
definitions.
4. Criminal U w *»977(1)
Trial judge may not enter judgment of
acquittal following jury verdict of guilty;
in case submitted to jury, only the jury
may acquit
I Criminal Law *»975, 977(1), 1024(4)
Trial judge's postverdict ruling, that
facts proved did not constitute a public
offense, was in nature of an "arrest of
judgment" and not a "judgment of acquittal," so that state could appeal trial court's
ruling. U.CJL1953, 77-18a-l.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
1 Criminal Law *»5
Power to define crimes is vested in
legislature.
7. Larceny *»7
Partner may be convicted of theft of
partnership property even though, aa partser, he is co-owner of property taken.
U.CJL1958, 76-6-404.
1 Larceny *»7
To obtain conviction for theft, state
does not have to prove who owned property, but only that accused obtained or exercised unauthorized eontrol over property of
"other. U.OA.1958, 76-*4©4.

&

BENCH, Presiding Judge:
The State appeals from an "Order Arresting Judgment and Entering Judgment
of Acquittal" after a jury found the defendant guilty of theft in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). We reverse
and remand for reinstatement of the guilty
verdict and imposition of sentence.
FACTS
In 1971, defendant formed a corporation
known as Granada, Inc., which developed
real estate primarily through the partnerships and limited partnerships it created.
Defendant served as president of Granada
and, along with members of his family,
owned the corporation.
In 1979, Granada created Three Crowns
Ltd., a limited partnerahip, and sold limited
partnership interests to a number of investors. Three Crowns then purchased a mobile home park in Las Vegaa, Nevada. Defendant waa one of three general partners
in Three Crowns and in 1980, Granada became the acting general partner.
In 1986, when Granada began experiencing a aerioua caah flow problem, members
of Granada's executive committee met regularly to discuss and attempt to remedy the
problem. The committee discussed selling
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the Three Crowns property, but did not
decide to sell i t On October 10, 1986,
defendant sold the property without telling
any of the members of Granada's executive
committee, and deposited the proceeds of
$1,073,000 into the Three Crown's bank
account Defendant drew a check for
$600,000 on the account, deposited it in
Granada's Interoffice Account, and transferred $500,000 to an account for Utah
Mortgage Fund, a proposed securities offering by Granada that would allow Granada to bring in additional investment money.
By October 23, 1986, defendant had
transferred all the proceeds of the sale of
the Three Crowns property to Granada's
accounts without the knowledge either of
Granada's executive committee members or
the limited partners of Three Crowns, who
were the alleged victims of the theft. Granada's books listed the proceeds as loans,
but no payments were ever made to Three
Crowns. The State's expert testified at
trial that in March 1986, Granada was already insolvent "to the tune of $20 million," which condition worsened with time.

property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neil Mortenson, tad
others with a purpose to deprive them
thereof." At the close of the State's esse,
defendant moved to dismiss the charge on
the grounds the facts proved did not constitute a public offense. The trial court denied the motion and defendant proceeded
with his case. At the close of all the evidence, the defendant again moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a directed
verdict, arguing that the facts proved did
not constitute a public offense. Once
again, the court denied defendant's motion.
Finally, after the jury returned a guilty
verdict, defendant filed a "Motion in Arrest
of Judgment, or in the Alternative, for
New Trial on Theft Conviction." The trial
court granted the motion to arrest judgment and entered a judgment of acquittal.
On appeal, the State contends the trial
court erred in concluding the facts proved
at trial did not constitute a public offense
and in ordering an arrest of judgment on
that basis. Defendant disagrees and further argues that because the trial court
entered a judgment of acquittal, the State
may not appeal.

Limited partners of Three Crowns, including Ned Gregerson and Neil Mortenson, learned of the sale of the partnership
property, asked defendant to distribute
their shares to them, and instructed defenSTATE'S RIGHT TO APPEAL
dant on how they wanted their shares of
[1] Utah Code Ann. f 77-18a-l (Supp
the proceeds to be reinvested. Defendant
never distributed the shares to them. Lim- 1991) "delineates a narrow category of
ited partner John Chamberlain requested a cases in which the prosecution may take an
cash distribution, but only received a lesser appeal." State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223,
valued interest in another mobile home 224 (Utah 1985); accord State v. Amador,
park, despite defendant's assurances that 804 P.2d 1283,1284 (Utah App.1990). Tte
he would receive the money. Robert Nel- State may appeal from:
son, another limited partner, also did not
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
receive a requested distribution.
(b) an order arresting judgment;
In January 1987, Granada's executive
(c)
an order terminating the prosecucommittee and lower management detertion
because
of a finding of double jeopmined that Granada had a negative net
ardy
or
denial
of a speedy trial;
worth of between $8 to $7 million. Grana(d) a judgment of the court holding s
da filed for bankruptcy. Defendant then
statute or any part of it invalid;
made several disbursements of the proceeds from the sale of the Nevada proper(e) an order of the court granting a
ty, but none to the limited partners named
-pretrial motion to auppress evidence
above.
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
Defendant was charged with theft for
would
be in the interest of justice; or
"txerds[ing] unauthorized control over the

STATE v. LARSEN
Utah 5 8 9
* (tfa&Ap* ma)
(f) an order of the court granting a sion of all the evidence, . . . [if] the evinotion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no dence is not legally sufficient to establish
contest
the offense charged therein or any lesser
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2). The State, included offense." Utah RCrimP. 17(o).
however, may not appeal a valid acquittal The rules also allow a judge to arrest judg"DO matter how overwhelming the evidence ment at any time prior to sentencing.
against the defendant may be." State v. Utah R.Crim.P. 23. There is no rule, howMusselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah ever, that allows a judge, who is not the
trier of fact, to acquit a defendant follow1988).
[2] The trial court's ruling was entitled ing a jury verdict of guilty.
In State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 251
"Order Arresting Judgment and Entering
Judgment of Acquittal/1 To determine (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court statwhether a ruling is one that the State may ed: "When there has been a trial by jury,
appeal under section 7?-18a-l(2), "we look the state, as well as the defendant, is entito the substance of the ruling and not to tled to the benefit of the findings and the
ft]he label attached . . . by a trial judge/" verdict of the jury/' Id. at 251. In Myers,
State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 the supreme court reinstated the jury's
(Utah App.) (quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d guilty verdict after concluding the trial
st 1064), cert granted, 817 PJ5d 827 (Utah court improperly invaded the province of
1991); see also State v. Willard, 801 P.2d the jury by arresting judgment based on its
own weighing of the evidence. Id at 252189, 191 (Utah App.1990).
53. Only where the trial court is the fact[3,41 There is an acquittal if the pros- finder does its assessment of the evidence
ecution resulted in a finding of not guilty amount to an acquittal, and the State may
by the trier of facts or in a determination not appeal in that situation. See Willard,
that there was insufficient evidence to war- 801 P.2d at 191-42 (in a bench trial, a trial
rant conviction/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-1- court's order based on its assessment of
403(2) (1990). Thus, a ruling that consti- the sufficiency of the evidence is an acquittutes "a factual resolution in favor of the tal).
defendant on one or more of the elements
An arrest of judgment is based on a
of the offense charged is an acquittal/' finding that the facts proved do not constiMusselman, 667 P»2d at 1064; see also tute a public offense. Under common law
Willard, 801 P.2d at 191. An acquittal is and the federal rule, "a judgment can be
based on an assessment of the evidence, arrested only on the basis of error appearand in a jury trial, "[i)t is within the exclu- ing on the 'face of the record,' and not on
sive province of the jury to judge the credi- the basis of proof offered at trial/' United
bility of the witness and the weight of the States v. Sisson, 899 U.S. 267,281,90 S.Ct
evidence." State «. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 2117, 2125, 26 L.EcL2d 608 (1970). The
97 (Utah 1982). Therefore, in a case sub- Utah rule is not as limiting and requires a
mitted to a jury, only the jury may acquit trial court to "arrest judgment if the facts
the defendant
proved or admitted do not constitute a pubIn Utah, a judge may not acquit a defen- lic offense, or the defendant is mentally ill,
dant after a jury returns a guilty verdict1 or there is other good cause for the arrest
Utah rules provide that a judge may issue of judgment" Utah R.Crim.P. 23. The
an order dismissing an information or in* Utah rule allows a judge to look beyond the
dkrtment "[*}t the conclusion of the evi- face of the record at the facts actually
dence by the prosecution, or at the condu- proved or admitted in determining whether
it tide 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Prcprovides that the government may appeal from
eadure allows a federal judge to ester a judga judge-entered acquittal following a Jury verment of acquittalfollowinga jury verdict of
dict of guilty, pursuant to 18 US.C f 3731.
Suflty. See United Sum v. Martin Linen Supply
United States v. Wilson, 420 VS. 332,352-53,95
C*. 430 VS. 564,565-66, 97 S.Ct 1349,1351-52, &CL 1013, 1026, 43 L£d2d 232 (1975).
51 LExUd 642 (1977). Hie federal scheme alio
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the alleged conduct was prohibited. See
Workman, 806 P.2d at 1202. But $ee
State v. Owens, 758 P.2d 876, 978 (Utah
App.1988) (suggesting Utah rule does not
allow the trial court to go beyond the face
of the record to consider "proof offered or
adduced at trial").
15] We conclude Hie trial court's ruling
in this case was an arrest of judgment and
not an acquittal. The trial court arrested
judgment, finding that the facts proved did
not constitute a public offense because the
defendant, a general partner, could not
have committed theft by taking partnership
property. Although the trial court's order
was also labeled an acquittal, the order was
not based on a finding of insufficient evidence. In denying defendant's motion to
dismiss at the close of the prosecution's
case, the trial court specifically stated that
it found there was sufficient evidence. The
trial court again found the evidence sufficient when it denied defendant's motion to
dismiss at the close of all the evidence. In
any event, after a jury verdict of guilty is
entered, the trial court may not acquit
"Because the trial court's ruling was an
arrest of judgment, and not an acquittal,
the State has a right to appeal.

THEFT OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
The State contends the trial court erred
in concluding the facts proved or admitted
at trial do not constitute a public offense.
Defendant responds that the trial court's
action was proper because the State advances a unique or novel theory in prosecuting defendant for theft, and the proper
remedy for defendant's actions exists in
the civil arena.
Ml *TTJhe power to define Crimes . . . is
vested in the legislature." State v. Often,
757 P^d 482, 468 (Utah 1988). "In the
absence of a legislative expression to the
contrary, courts have ordinarily held that a
partner cannot be guilty of larceny for
misappropriating firm property, with any
such defalcations left for resolution in the

civil arena."

Peoplev.Zinke,UK.YM&,

2. Model Penal Code § 223^7) defino-proper.
ty of another" to include "property in which any
person other than the actor has an interest

656 N.Y-S^d 11, 18, 555 N.E.2d 263, 265
(1990). The common-law theory is that because partners are co-owners of partnership property, they cannot misappropriate
what is already theirs. Id; Patterson v.
Bogan, 261 S.C. 87, 198 S.EJM 586, 588
(1973); State v. Birch, 86 WasLApp. 405,
675 P M 246, 248 (1984) (legislatively overruled—theft of partnership property is now
a crime in Washington, State v. Webb, 64
Wash App. 480, 824 P.2d 1257,1263 (Wash.
App.1992)); Jane M. Draper, Annotation,
Embezzlement, Larceny, False Pretenses,
or Allied Criminal Fraud by a Partner,
82 AJLR.3d 822, 825 (1978).
[7] The Utah legislature has chosen to
abandon the common-law theory. Utah
Code Ann. { 76-6-404 (1990) states: "A
person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof." Utah's theft statute further provides that 'fijt is no defense under this
part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is
not entitled to infringe." Utah Code Ann.
{ 76-6-402(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
One commentator has explained how subeection 76-6-402(2) applies to theft of partnership property:
Under subparagraph (2), one may be
prosecuted for theft if he takes the property of another, although the actor hsd
an interest in it For example, if a member of a partnership withdraws, without
the consent of the other, moneyfromthe
partnership account so as to infringe
mpon the tights of the other partner,
such withdrawal could constitute theft,
although the actor had an interest in the
account
Jay V. Barney, Utah Criminal Code Cmmentary 185 (1967), (found in Loren Dale
Martin, Utah Criminal Code Ouilme
(W78)).
In taking this approach, Utah has followed the Model Penal Code.1 The comwhich the actor is not privileged to tefrinr
regardless of the fact that the actor also bst an
interest in the property."

STATE v. LABSEN
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Bents to the Model Penal Code explain that
the "comprehensive definition of 'property9
s intended to abrogate whatever still survives of the artificial common-law restriction* on the scope of larceny and the other
theft offenses/' Model Penal Code f 223.2
comment S (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980); see also Draper, 82
AUlSd at 827; 2 Wayne R. LaFave &
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.4, n. 88 and accompanying
text (1986). Therefore, under the language
of the Utah statute and the Model Penal
Code, s partner may be convicted of theft
of partnership property.1 See Model Penal
Code (223.2 comment 4; Wharton's
Criminal Law, { 419 and n. 45 (1980).

found, as a matter of law, that a contract
between Burton and Waldron imposed no
legal duty upon Burton to use the specific
funds he received from Waldron to pay the
bank. Id at 819. Therefore, we reversed
Burton's theft conviction because there
was no legal basis for finding that Burton
exercised "unauthorized control" over the
funds paid by Waldron to Burton. We
then indicated that a chrfl action was traditionally viewed as an adequate remedy in
such cases. See idL

[10] In the present case, the trial court
relied on Burton, finding that although
"the facts proved at trial may conceivably
give rise to civil liability, . . . such facts do
Defendant contends that even if Utah not constitute the public offense of theft"
hw is such that a partner may be convicted In contrast to Burton, this defendant was
for theft of partnership property, he was not authorized as a matter of law to deal
sot charged with theft of partnership prop- with partnership property as he wished.
erty, but with taking the property of four Although the partnership agreement grantindividual partners, and because the part- ed the general partners numerous powers,
ners have a remedy in the form of a civil it contained the limitation that a general
tctkm, criminal prosecution is precluded. partner exercise those powers only in the
We disagree.
best interests of the partnership. The
[8] To obtain a conviction for theft, the agreement did not authorize defendant to
State does not have to prove who owned deal with partnership property in a manner
the property. The State must prove "only that he knew was not in the partnership's
Ait the accused obtained or exercised un- best interests. Therefore, in this case,
authorized control over the 'property of there was a legal basis for finding "unauanother.'" State v. Simmons, 578 P»2d thorized control/' and it was for the jury to
141,843 (Utah 1977). Thus, the distinction decide whether a theft was committed.
defendant draws between partnership property and the property of individual partners
CONCLUSION
ii not determinative.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
[I] In addition, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that the existence of a under Utah's statutory scheme, a partner
civil remedy does not excuse criminal con- may be convicted of theft for exercising
duct See State v. Walton, 646 ?J2d 689, unauthorized control over partnership prop01 (Utah 1982). Defendant nevertheless erty and that Burton does not preclude
relies upon this court's decision in State v. criminal liability in this case. Therefore,
Burton, 800 PJW 817 (Utah App.1990) for we conclude, the trial court erred in deterthe proposition that if there is a civil reme- mining the facts proved at trial do not
dy, aWinal prosecution is precluded Bur- constitute a public offense, and in arresting
ttm does not so bold. In Burton, we judgment on that basis. Accordingly, we
a Other jurisdictions also provide thsts partner
any be convicted for theft of partnership property. S* «*, HopU v. Sobuk, 30 CaLAppM
4SI, 106 CaLRptr. 319. 525-26, cert M M 414
US. 855,94 S.0.155, 31 L&&2d 104 (1973) ("ft
is both illogical and unreasonable to hold that a
partner cannot steal from his partners merely

because be has an undivided interest in the
partnership property. Fundamentally, stealing
that portion of the partners' shares which does
not belong to the thief is no different from
stealing the property of any other person.");
Suae v. Si*% 197 Neb. SI, 24S N.W^d 1, 6
(1976); Webb, S24 ?2d at 1263.
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reverse and remand for reinstatement of
the jury verdict and sentencing.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.
ft
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Todd Allen PARKER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. M0265-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 12, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F.
Wilkinson, J., of burglary of a dwelling,
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Russon, J., held that police lacked required
probable cause to arrest him so that his
subsequent statements had to be suppressed.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Automobiles #»M9(2)
Reasonableness of traffic stop, which
is limited seizure and more like investigative detention than custodial arrest* is assessed under principles governing investigative detentions based on whether officer's action was justified in it inception and
whether action was reasonably related in
scope to circumstances which justified initial interference. U&&A. ConstAmends.
4,5.
2. Automobiles * * 4 K 2 )
Officer had justification for initial atop
of defendant where defendant was driving
45 miles per hour in 25-mile per hour acne.
S. Automobiles **4»(8)
While police officer had discretion to
atop defendant for traffic violation, arrest

tor burglary was not based on reasonable
articulated suspicion where, at time of stop,
only fact that tied defendant to burglaries
Was presence of vehicle he was driving m
%rea near where crime occurred; presence
of vehicle, without more, did not give rise
to reasonable suspicion.
4. Automobiles e»349(15)
Police officer did not have discretion to
Remove defendant from his vehicle, handtuff him, and place him under arrest after
Witnessing defendant exceed speed limit
While entering driveway absent any reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant
Was involved in earlier burglaries.
Joan C. Watt and James C. Bradshaw,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appelknt
R. Paul Van Dam and Kris C. Leonard,
$alt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and
ItUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
RUSSON, Judge:
Todd Allen Parker appeals his convictions of three counts of burglary of s
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. J 76-6-202 (1990).
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On the night of September 5 and the
*arly morning hours of September 6,1990,
three garages in and around a West Jordan
%nbdiviaioD in Salt lake County wan bur
flarized. In response to a dispatch call,
I)eputy Wayne Dial drove to the home of
One of the victims, Sharon Gamboa. Mrs.
<4amboa informed him that she had beerf
•omeone in the garage and, upon investigation, discovered that some items had been
*emoved from the vehicles therein. IV
Ontaide door to the garage was sjar, a
*ereen had been cut from one of the garsp
•Windows, and the window had been opened.
Ifrt. Gamboa then described two men
%hom she had seen immediately thereafter
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-ooOooThis is an appeal from an Arrest of Judgment
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reasonable remedy under the circumstance* was to grant a Judgment
of Acquittal. Therefore, since the Judgment of Acquittal was based
on a factual determination of Insufficiency of the evidence by
Judge Ru8Son, Appellee has once been placed in jeopardy under both
the Utah and United States Constitutions.

Therefore, as the

Supreme Court stated in Musselman, supra this brief p. 15, any
opinion this Court renders in regard to this case would be an
advisory opinion which is beyond this Court's power*

See also

State v. Overson, 489 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1971).
As an interesting footnote to this point, the Court should be
aware of the fact that Judge Russon stated on the record that had
he not arrested judgment in this case and granted Judgment of
Acquittal, he would have ordered a new trial:
"• • « (Z)f my ruling had been otherwise, Z
would have granted a new trial because Z don't
think the instruction clearly outlined that
intent as is necessary in the element instructions a Z think you can do something with a
purpose, but Z am not sure that that constitutes intent as required by the statute and
defined earlier in the statute of a specific
intent to deprive* • •"
(R. 1619 p.110).
Therefore, if this Court remands this ease, the proper remedy
is not to reinstate the jury verdict, but to remand the ease for
further proceedings consistent with this Court9s opinion. If such
further proceedings are allowed by this Court in the lower court,
then it is presumed Judge Russon (or his successor) will enter an
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order granting the Appellee a new trial based upon Judge Russon's
comments outlined above.
Therefore, this clearly becomes s caae where a defendant would
be required to be retried despite the fact that a Judgment of
Acquittal had been entered after his first trial based upon the
insufficiency of the evidence.

Such e result simply cannot be

tolerated under our constitutional system of justice for the
reasons stated herein, and Appellee respectfully requests that the
prosecution's appeal be dismissed.
POINT H I
THE FACTS PROVEN AT TRIAL DO WOT CONSTITUTE A
PUBLIC OFFENSE.
Even if this Court were to find that Appellant has a right to
appeal the trial court's Judgment of Acquittal, and that jeopardy
did not attach when the Judgment of Acquittal was entered, Appellee
argues that Judge Russon's determination that the facts proven at
trial did not constitute s public offense should be upheld and
affirmed by this Court.
To fully understand the reasons why Judge Russon entered not
only an arrest of judgment but also s Judgment of Acquittal in the
instant case, it is necessary to review his comments in open court
at the time of the hearing on Appellee's Motions.

Judge Russon

stated:
"THE COURT: X guess, I was on the trial
bench for about six and s half, closing in on
ssven years, and of all the criminal cases I
hsvs handled, of course, this particular issue
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Z think has given us the greatest difficulty.
We livs in s commercial world of contracts.
We have breach of contract daily. Lawsuits
galore.
Partners suing partners, limited
partners suing general partners. Shareholders
of corporations suing shareholders. Creditors
suing both. And we cone with this particular
case that has been argued at great length all
through the trial and here and, Z suppose,
because it is so unusual.
Z don't suppose, Mr. Parrish, you have found
a case. Z think Z asked you during the trial.
You have any case anyplace in the United
States with similar facts that indicate that
constituted theft? At that time, you didn't,
but do you have any today?
MR. PARRISH: No, Z didn't in our pleadings,
but we still haven*t found a case that is
exactly in point.
THE COURT: Zt is that unusual. Zf it is that
difficult for us, the interpretation of this
agreement and the law, then the question
comes: Can there be any evidence under the
instructions that a jury can find one guilty
of theft beyond a reasonable doubt? We have
so many problems ourselves In dealing with
this issue, and probably it hasn't been ruled
on anyplace in the United - there is no ruling
we know of anyplace in the United States. And
it gives us great difficulty.

Probably the reason we have no cases presented
here of any authority of this constituting a
crime is because it is always through civilly
(sic)• But the State in this case chose to
treat it as a theft and Z have agonised over
it myself« • »
(Ra 1619 pp. 104-106).
Z believe that this is a civil matter. Z
think that the argument that has been made is
basically set to rest by State vs. Burton.
25

That the facts are somewhat similar. That
this is really basically a civil matter.
X don't condone what has been done. I have
already given Mr. Larsen my lecture when I
sentenced him on the Securities Fraud.
I
still feel that way. Z feel what was done
here was a very bad thing, destructive on
people, that's morally wrong. But the remedy
that exists exists in the civil courts for
fraud and for civil action, and that what has
gone on here does not constitute theft. Z
think that is the reason we do not find a case
anyplace in this United States, or all 50
states and all the Supreme Courts and Courts
of Appeal and Federal Courts of Appeal. There
is not one case that can be brought here to
show that these particular facts can constitute theft, and I don't believe that they
constitute theft in this particular case. So
I therefore grant the motion in arrest of
judgment. . •" (Emphasis added).
(R. 1619 pp. 109, 110).
Appellant argues in its brief that:
"• . « In short, the Court did not identify
any statutory element of theft which was not
established by the facts proved at trial, and
essentially held that, under Utahvs theft
statute, the general partner in a limited
partnership cannot be guilty of stealing
partnership property.
The Court obviously
believed that the sole remedy for misappropriation of partnership property by a general
partner lies in the civil arena. This legal
conclusion is erroneous."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, 12.
This assumption by Appellant is absolutely false and is not
based on anything stated by the Judge nor ruled upon by the Court
In any way.

The Court at no time held that a general partner in

a limited partnership cannot be guilty of stealing partnership
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property. What Appall ant haa dona hara la to eraata a "atraw man"
and than apand aavaral pages in Ita briaf knocking down tha "straw
nan" in an affort to convince tha Court that tha Judge drew an
erroneous legal coneluaion.

Thia is abaolutely false!

Appellee

challenges Appellant to cite one place in the record where the
Court makes such a ruling or statement.

Appellee respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court during oral argument ask
Appellant for a citation to the record on this point.

Appellee

submits that Appellant cannot oblige and is merely making an
assumption baaed upon pure speculation.

In fact, the aesumption

is wrong!
The Amended Information in the instant caae charges Appellee
with exercising ". . . unauthorized control over the property of
John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, or Neal Mortens en,
with the purpose to deprive them thereof •" (R. 1863). Appellee may
agree with Appellant that Utah law is such that an individual may
be convicted of stealing partnership property, but Appellee in the
instant case was accueed of stealing the property of individual
limited partners and not the property of the partnerehip. The name
of the partnership was Three Crowns Limited.

Appellant choee to

go to jury trial with an allegation that the property of the
individual partnere had been the subject of a theft; mo the "straw
man" created by Appellant in ita brief simply does not exist!
The Judge seemed to accept the argument advanced by Appellee
in hie Motion in Arrest of Judgment or in the Alternative for New
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Trial. That argument was to the effect that it la very clear that
If the alleged limited partner victims in the Instant case had a
grievance with the manner in which the Appellee handled the funds
from the sale of the mobile home park in Las Vegas, they had the
same right that any creditor of the limited partnership would have
under Utah law to bring a civil action against the general partner.
Utah Code Ann. S 48-2a-606 provides: *(A)t the time a partner
becomes entitled to receive a distribution, he has the status of,
and is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the
limited partnership with respect to the distribution".

This

section seems to make clear that a limited partner in Utah does not
own the partnership property, but merely possesses an Interest in
the nature of the interest of any creditor, in a distribution of
the ultimate proceeds of the partnership.
As stated earlier, the property the limited partners in the
instant

case were

allegedly

deprived

of,

a portion

of

the

$838,000.00 proceeds from the sale of a mobile home park in Las
Vegas, Nevada, was property of the partnership itself, and not the
property of the individual partners.

Therefore, Appellant's

evidence at trial failed to prove the allegation in the Amended
Information, i.e. that the property of individuals was "stolen1'
from those individuals.
This argument becomes particularly significant when it is
noted that in paragraph 2.2 of the Certificate and Agreement of
Limited Partnership for Three Crowns Limited, (Trial Exhibit P-l
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•ttached as Add. 2), the partnership was givan tha authority to
"engage In or posseas any interest in other ventures which may or
may not have similar business purposes as those set forth. . •"
Further, paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2 clearly indicate that distribution
of any partnership assets or proceeds was "• • • subject to
maintaining the Partnership in a sound financial and cash position. . .". Such distributions of cash or other property would be
made to the limited partners only when " . . . the General Partner,
in his absolute discretion, determines (such) is not needed in the
operation (of the partnership), but any distribution will be made
only if, in the absolute judgment and discretion of the General
Partner, it will not in any way jeopardize or limit the bualness
of the Partnership." (Emphaala added).
Furthermore, the Partnership Agreement provides in Section
15.1 that "(T)he General Partner shall be solely responsible for
the management of the Partnership business with all rights and
powers generally conferred by law or necessary, advisable or
consistent in connection therewith."
In addition, to the foregoing, the Partnership Agreement in
Section 15.2(F) provides that among the rights and powers to be
bald exclusively by the General Partner would be the power to
•(S)ell all or substantially all of tha assets of the Limited
Partnership without tha consent of tha Limited Partners".

The

General Partner, upon termination and dissolution of the partner•kip, la given the power under paragraph 21.1(C) to terminate and
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dissolve the partnership upon "(S)ale of all properties acquired
by the partnership If the General Partner In its sole discretion
determines there Is not a compelling reason to continue the
Partnership.* Also, Section 23*3 provides for a power of attorney
granted by the limited partner to the General Partner concurrently
with the execution of the Partnership Agreement to ". . . take any
further action which said attorney shall consider necessary or
convenient In connection with any of the foregoing hereby giving
said attorney full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done
In and about the foregoing as fully as said limited partner might
or could do If personally present, and hereby ratifying and
confirming all that said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue hereof."
The Subscription Agreement of each of the named Individuals
In the Amended Information was produced at trial (Plaintiff's
Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 11); and each of them did in fact
provide through those Subscription Agreements the power of attorney
referred to in Section 23.3 of the Partnership Agreement*
It should therefore be readily seen by this Court that
pursuant to Utah law, a limited partner simply stands In the shoes
of a normal creditor with regard to any distributions he feels he
Is entitled to receive at any time. Glvan the discretionary powers
granted to the General Partner outlined above, and the fact that
no limited partner had an ownership Interest In the proceeds of the
30

sale of the mobile hone park in the Las Vegas, Appellant utterly
and completely failed to prove that Appellee obtained or exercised
unauthorised control over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned
Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal Mortensen, and others with the
purpose to deprive them thereof, as alleged in the Amended Information.
In its opening brief, Appellant argues in a footnote that
"(T)he trial court Incorrectly relied on State v. Burton, 800 P.2d
817 (Utah App. 1990) (Add. 4), in reaching its conclusion that only
civil liability could arise under the facts of Defendant's case.
. ." Appellant's Opening Brief at page 17.
It is interesting that this footnote is the only place where
Appellant in its brief mentions the State v. Burton case. Appellant goes on to allege in its opening brief ". . .(U)nlike the
instant case, there was some question whether Burton exercised
'unauthorized control over the property of another,' and furthermore, the State's novel theory of criminal liability was not
supported by 'firm logic' or 'some basis, even if tangential, in
established precedent'".

Appellant's analysis of the Burton case

as applied by Judge Russon is inaccurate in several respects, and
certainly incomplete.
State v. Burton, supra, stands for the very clear proposition
that where the State advances a unique or novel theory of criminal
liability in what normally would be a civil business situation,
the appellate courts will require the prosecution to meet the
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"Incumbent burden of sound reasoning end persuasive authority" In
order to heve a guilty verdict upheld.

In that case, defendant

Burton attempted to sell a home to one Waldron.

The home In

question was encumbered by tiro trust deeds, with the first trust
deed containing a "due on sale" clause, barring assumption of the
note obligation by any subsequent purchaser.
Waldron was unable to obtain financing through the note holder
with the "due on sale" clause, so he entered Into a private
financing agreement with Burton.

Waldron was to make monthly

payments to Burton, who would then make the mortgage payment to the
holder of the trust deed with the "due on sale" clause; and It
would not be reported to the holder of the "due on sale" cleuse
that the home had been sold to another without the Bank's permission.
Although it was understood that Burton was to take the
payments Waldron made to him and make the mortgage payments to the
Bank, such was not explicit In the agreement between the parties.
Subsequently, Burton obtained the monthly payments from Waldron,
but failed to make the payments to the Bank, resulting in the
Bank's ultimate foreclosure on the property.

The State of Utah

brought theft charges against Burton, claiming that his failure to
apply the payments he received from Waldron to the Bank constituted
the crime of theft.
In analysing the ease for the Court of Appeals, Judge Orme
observed:
32

"Tha stata advancaa a unlqua thaory of
criminal liability In this casa. Zt is quits
tailing that naithar aids has praaantad tha
court with any dacision validating or precluding tha criminal prosacution of what is sssentially a braach of a raal astata sala agreement.
Ha are not unreceptive to novel theories of law whan they are supported by firm
logic and hava soma basis, avan if tangential,
in established precedent. However, the mora
unique the innovation, tha greater will ba the
incumbent burden of sound of reasoning and
persuasive authority.
Such reasoning and
authority are notably absent in this case.
Zn that posture we are loathe to give approval to tha broad construction of Section
76-6-404 (the theft statute) urged upon us by
the state. Were we to do so, it lm likely
that memorials of commercial transactions
would soon be drafted to Include boilerplate
language designed to Impose criminal liability
for interruptions in the stream of payments —
a circumstance which would normally be nothing more than a braach of contract, traditionally viewed as adequately remedied through
an action of law". (Emphasis added).
800 P.2d 817, 819.
Appellee would bring tha Court's attention to tha Statement
of Facts at the beginning of this brief.

Zt can raadlly ba seen

from these facts that what was Involved in tha Instant ease was a
normal civil situation which waa enforceable by limited partnars
through an action at law.

This was the vary situation Judge Orme

indicated should ba handled civilly and not criminally in Stata v.
Burton, supra.
Although U.C.A. S 48-2a-606 of tha Utah Llmltad Partnership
Act providing that s limited partner has tha status of those
entitled to the remedies of a creditor with respect to a distribu33

tion from the partnership, did not become effective until 1990,
Appellee maintains that the entire scheme of the Utah Limited
Partnership Act prior to (as well as subsequent to) its amendment
has been to provide that a limited partner, at the time he becomes
entitled to receive a distribution, has all the remedies available
to a creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the
distribution.

The specific enactment of U.C.A. S 48-2a-606,

effective in 1990, merely codified and clarified that philosophy,
which has permeated the entire Utah Limited Partnership Act from
its inception.
In addition, U.C.A. S 48-2-22 (1953), in effect at the time
of the alleged theft in this case, provided that a creditor of a
limited partner may charge only the interest of the indebted
limited partner with payment of any unsatisfied claim. Subsection
2 of that statute specifically stated:

"The interest may be

redeemed with the separate property of any general partner, but may
not be redeemed with partnership property."

This statute estab-

lished clearly that a limited partner had no right to, nor Interest
in specific partnership property even prior to the enactment of the
new oode provision in 1990.
What seems very clear Is that Appellant's prosecution of the
Instant theft case Is Indeed a unique effort on its part to create
a criminal situation out of "a circumstance which would normally
be nothing more than a breach of contract, traditionally viewed as
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adequately remedied through an action of law."

State v. Burton,

supra at 819.
Although challenged to do so by Judge Russon during the course
of arguments regarding Appellee's motion to dismiss on the basis
herein discussed, Appellant was unable to present a single case in
which the instant type of fact situation had resulted in a criminal
offense. Appellant was forced to admit that there was no appellate
court precedent for its prosecution, although it claimed that the
conduct of Appellee met the legal requirements of the theft
statute.

Zt was just this kind of effort by Appellant to expand

a normal civil breach of contract situation into a criminal theft
that resulted in the reversal of Burton's jury conviction in State
v. Burton, supra.

Mad the limited partners felt aggrieved as a

result of the methods in which Appellee had loaned the funds of the
partnership during the interim period prior to distribution, they
would have had, and still have, the right to file a civil lawsuit
against Appellee and perhaps obtain a judgment.

Their civil

lawsuit would be based upon an allegation of the Appellee's breach
of contract, i.e., alleged breach of the provisions of the Certificate of Agreement of Limited Partnership to which the limited
partners subscribed.
CONCLUSION
Appellee maintains that Appellant has no right to appeal the
Court's Judgment of Acquittal In the instant matter and the appeal
should be dismissed on that basis.
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Should the Court find other-

ADDENDUM E

nittMSTIMCTCOttRT
Third Judicial District

DEC 1 9 1990

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

C. DEAN LARSEN,

CRIMINAL NO. 891900927

Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1

You are
charged by

instructed that

the Information

commission of

THEFT

the defendant

which has

C. DEAN LARSEN

been duly

is

filed vith the

The Information alleges:

THEFT,
a Second Degree Felony.
On or about October 10,
1986, in Salt Lake County, Utah, and in violation of Utah Code
Ann., Section 76-6-404, the defendant, C. DEAN LARSEN, did obtain
or exercise unauthorized control over the property of John
Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal Mortensen, and
others vith a purpose to deprive them thereof. The value of said
property was in excess of $1,000.00, a second degree felony.

0C1FM3

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

In every crime or public offense there must be a union
or joint operation of act and intent.

The intent or mental state

with which a person acts is manifested by the circumstances
connected with the offense and the conduct of that person in
relation to the offense.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

The intent or state of mind of a person who engages in
conduct is rarely provable by direct evidence.

The intent or

purpose to deprive which is an element of the offense of Theft
may be inferred from the Defendant's acts, conduct and statements
or other circumstantial evidence which you find relates to
whether or not he acted with the purpose to deprive the owners of
their property.

> r± i'-% -«. ^

INSTRUCTION NO.

'

Ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.

0C1P57

INSTRUCTION NO. * °
Under
criminally

our
for

system
mere

of

laws

Individuals

mistakes,

mere

carelessness, or mere errors of judgment.

are not

punished

mismanagement,

mere

They are punished only

for intentional wrongdoing. The Defendant here Is not on trial for
errors of judgment or mistakes or mismanagement, but Is on trial
for a criminal offense.

WIFZQ

INSTRUCTION NO,

H

You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah,
the following words have the following meanings:
1.
a

"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about

transfer

of

possession

or

of some other legally recognized

interest in property, whether to the obtainer or to another.
2.
personal

"Property" means anything of
property

as

money

value

and

includes such

and such intangible property as an

interest in or right to obtain money.
3.

"Obtain

conduct where

or

exercise

one who

unauthorized

has been

control"

entrusted with

another converts that property to his

own use

includes

the property of

without authority

to do so.
4.

"Purpose

to

deprive"

means

to

have

the

conscious

object:
(a) To
extended

a

period

withhold
or

to

property
use

permanently

or

for

so

under such circumstances that a

substantial portion of its economic value, or the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To

dispose

of

the

property under circumstances

that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.

ooi^rs

INSTRUCTION NO.

'*'

In order to convict the defendant of the charged offense,
you must find that he exercised unauthorized control over the
property of another while acting with the specific intent or
purpose to deprive the other person of his/her property, as
defined in these instructions.

It is not necessary that you find

that the Defendant formed such specific intent or purpose to
deprive at the time that he first obtained control over the
property of another, but such purpose to deprive may be found at
any period of time in which the defendant exercised unauthorized
control over such property.

INSTRUCTION NO.

_f_y

Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of THEFT,
as alleged in the Information, you must find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt,/allyof
the following elements of that
;,/all)<
crime:
1.

That the Defendant exercised unauthorised control;

2.

Over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson,
/

Robert Nelson, or Neal Mortensen;
3.

With a purpose to deprive them thereof;

4.

On or about October 10, 1986;

5.

In Salt Lake County, State of Utah;

6.

and, that the value of said property exceeded $1,000.00.

If ycu believe that the evidence establishes each and all of
the foregoing ele^nts .J>eyond-^a^rje.^sonable doubt, it is your duty
to find the defendant guilty of THEFT.
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish
one or more of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty of fTHEFT.\

-I-

INSTRUCTION NO.

Tou are instructed that it is not a defense to Theft that
the actor engaged in the conduct which constitutes the offense
with the intent of restoring the property to the owner at some
future time or through other funds or property.

If you find that

the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorised control over the
property of another or others and acted with the purpose to
deprive them of their property, the offense was complete at that
time and the Defendant's intent to later repay the money or even
his actual repayment is not a defense to Theft.

ADDENDUM F

INSTRUCTION NO.

K.

Before you can find the defendant, C. Dean Larsen, guilty of
the crime of "SECURITIES FRAUD" as alleged in Count One (1) of
the Information, you must find from the evidence all of the
following elements of the crime:
1.

That on or about January 7, 1986, in Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, the defendant, C. Dean Larsen;
2.

In connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any

security;
3.

Willfully made;

4.

To Carlos Flamand;

5.

Directly or Indirectly;

6.

An untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to

state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements of the crime of securities fraud,
beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your dutyAfind the
defendant guilty as to Count One (1) of the information. On the
other hand, if the evidence has failed to estfblisfi one or mc
^ore r J ^
of the above elements of the offense charges/>it
be your
i,/lit shall
shi
duty to find the defendant not guilty of the crime charged in
Count One (1).
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7
8

I

9
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10
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14
15
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Case No. 89-0927
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VOLUME III

C. DEAN LARSEN

The
regularly

above-entitled

cause
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action

for hearing before the Honorable
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1

I

THE COURT:

2

I

MR. GRIFFIN:

3

Call your next witness.
The State calls John C. Baldwin.

.TOHN

nrnarev BAT.DWTN

4

I Called as a witness on behalf of the State, after having

5

I been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

6

I follows:

7

DIRECT EXAMINATION

6
9

BY MR. GRIFFIN:
I

Q

Good afternoon, Mr. Baldwin. Would you please

10

I state your full name for the record and spell your last

11

I name.

12

I

A

Yes. John Cheney Baldwin, B-a-1-d-w-i-n.

13

I

Q

Where do you live?

14

A

1527 Princeton Avenue.

15

Q

And what do you do for a living?

A

I am currently the executive director of the

16

I

17

I Utah Bar Association.

18

I

Q

Are you a lawyer?

19

I

A

Yes, sir.

20

I

Q

How long have you been a lawyer?

21

I

A

For ten years.

22

I

Q

Would you briefly describe for the Jury your

23

I employment history?

24

I

25

I the Bar since September of this year.

I

A

Sure.

I have been the executive director of
For five years
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1

I previous to that I was the director of the Utah

2

J Securities Division.

3

I was an assistant Utah Attorney General, and for two years

4

J previous to that I was in private practice.

5

I

6

I who did you represent?

7

I

8

I Securities Division and for one of those years I

9

I represented various departments of state government.

10
11

Q

A

Q

For three years previous to that I

When you were at the Attorney General's Office,

For two of the years I represented the

Can you describe for the jury very briefly what

I the Utah Securities Division does?

12

A

Briefly, it takes care of enforcing a specific

13

I section of the Utah Code known as the Utah Uniform

14

I Securities Act which generally does three things. It

15

I registers, which means approves, certain sales of

16

I

17

I are to be sold in the state, unless those securities are

18

securities or offers of sales of securities before they

exempt otherwise from sale.

It licenses the people that

19

I sell the securities or give advice regarding securities

20

I and, thirdly, it investigates complaints of fraud

21

I

22

I

23

I Granada, Inc.?

24

I

A

Yes, sir.

25

I

Q

Are you familiar with the defendant Dean

Involving the offer and sale of securities.
Q

Are you familiar with a company known as
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Larsen?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

How did you come to know of Granada, Inc.?
MR. KELLER:

Your Honor, at this time may

counsel approach the bench?
THE COURT: You may.
(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
THE COURT: You may proceed.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, I believe my

question was, how did you come to know the entity known
as Granada, Inc.?
A

What I recall, the early part of 1985 when I

was in the Attorney General's Office, I was asked to sit
in with another Assistant Utah Attorney General who was
discussing with a friend of his concerns about Granada.
Apparently this friend of his had worked for Granada.
MR. KELLER:

I would object at this point, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, subsequent to

1965, do you know if Granada had dealings with the Utah
Securities Division?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And what were those dealings concerning?

110

A

At a certain point in time on behalf of the

division when I was there, we sat down with lawyers
representing Granada in order to resolve complaints that
had been filed with our office regarding the operations.
Q

And can you give us some idea of the nature of

those complaints?
MR. KELLER:

Objection, irrelevant and

immaterial to the issue before the Court.
MR. GRIFFIN:

Can we approach the bench, Your

Honor.
THE COURT: You may.
(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
THE COURT: Restate your question.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, do you recall

that one of the issues that you were looking at or the
division was looking at was the sale of unregistered
securities?
A

Yes, that is correct.

Q

Do you recall how that was related to Granada?

Can you explain that a little?
h

Well» there was, to my recollection, several

entities which I would recall are satellites around
Granada. That Granada was an operation in which money
was going. There were other entities in which money was
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1

I coming and going, and that collectively we will refer to

2

f that group BB Granada because that essentially was the

3

I mother ship. We were again concerned that certain of

4

I these sales of promissory notes, securities, other types

5

I of instruments constituted unregistered securities which

6

I had not been registered and that was the basis of the

7

I discussions that we had with Granada.

6

I

9

I money that was invested in these unregistered securities?

Q

10

Can you recall the magnitude of the amount of
MR. KELLER: Objection. I think there is an

11

I improper foundation for that, Your Honor. He is asking

12

I the vltneee

13

I is specific, and I think it is inappropriate.

14

I

15

I he knows.

16

I

17

I money that were involved in the division's Investigation?

18

I

19

I is, as well as that, in order to reconcile the

20

I negotiations and to provide an offering statement to our

21

I satisfaction to keep the operation ongoing, that

22

I collectively was $15 million.

23

I

24

I take it back even further than that. You had testified

25

I that you talked to attorneys who represented Granada.

to recollect something from his memory that
THE COURT: That can be answered yes or no, if

Q
A

Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Do you recall the amounts of
It was millions of dollars. My recollection

You mentioned an offering statement. Let's
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1

I

A

That ie correct.

2

I

Q

What were you negotiating?

3

I

A

Originally, we were negotiating the very

4

I element of whether or not what they were selling was

5

I securities. We indicated to them that it was our

6

I contention that they were securities and, of course, it

7

I was theirs that it was not at that point in time. We

8

I then reached the point in those discussions when we

9

I resolved that —

10

I

Q

Let me stop you there for a minute. When the

11

I division was investigating this case, did you have some

12

I concerns beyond the fact that the securities were simply

13

I not registered?

14

I

15

I

16

I

17

I

18

I that you would be concerned about in that situation?

19

I

20

I attention were not only that there was unregistration of

21

I securities —-

22

I

MR. KELLER:

23

I

THE COURT: Let lie have you come back to the

24

I bench a moment.

25

I will have you taken to the Jury room for a breather. I

MR. KELLER:

Objection, irrelevant and

immaterial, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
Q

A

Sustained.

(By Mr. Griffin) What are the types of things

Well, the allegations that had come to our

Objection.

In fact, ladles and gentlemen, I think I
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1

I have a little legal matter I want to clear up here.

2

I

3

I

4

I courtroom.

5

I here now. We tried 18 counts of Securities Fraud.

6

I we are here on a theft charge. What relevance does this

7

I have?

8

I

9

I evidence will show that the money from the theft was used

10

(Jury left the courtroom.)
The record will show the Jury has left the
What is the relevance of all of this? We are

MR. GRIFFIN:

Now

Your Honor* we believe that the

I to fund an escrow account for an entity known as Utah

11

Mortgage Fund, which was a limited offering.

That the

12

I defendant took the proceeds from the sale of Three Crowns

13

I and deposited them in a bank.

14

I Deposited them in a bank to be held against a recision

15

I offering, which means that the defendant wanted to sell

16

I new investments. The Securities Division was registering

17

I that offering.

18

I forward, a $15 million offering of new Investor money to

19

I go forward without sufficient capital in Granada, which

20

I they knew was scrapped for cash at the time, and they

21

I wouldn't allow it to go forward without a guarantee of

22

I $500,000. The defendant provided that by appropriating

23

I the Three Crowns' proceeds.

24

I

25

I question with Mr. Baldwin is that the division was

I

$500,000 to be exact.

They would not allow that offering to go

Mow, what I am trying to get at with this last

114

1

I concerned with disclosures to investors.

2

I

3

I He either took the money and misappropriated the money,

4

J embezzled the money, whatever you want, he either did it

5

I or didn't. Regardless of where it went or what he did

6

I with-it. Whether he bought land in Switzerland or Just

7

I put it back into other entities of his own, what

8

I relevance does any of that have to that?

9

I

THE COURT: Now, what relevance does it have?

MR. GRIFFIN:

It absolutely goes to his intent.

10

I Granada is scrapped for cash and what is going to come in

11

I at the Dussex Monument is this new offering of $15

12

I million.

13

I addition to that, we keep on hearing Mr. Keller accuse

14

I

the State of putting Granada into bankruptcy.

15

I

is entitled to know why the State did that.

16

I

17

I Utah Mortgage Fund offering, it does not have any

18

I relevance to the issue before the Court, which is the

19

I question of the misappropriation or misuse of funds of

20

I Three Crowns.

21

I

22

I we will see that funds from the Three Crowns' sale were

23

I deposited in the Three Crowns' account.

24

I to the Granada Interoffice Account and then through a

25

I series of tracings, the accountant will attempt to trace

The $500,000 is deposited in the escrow.

MR. KELLER:

In

The Jury

Your Honor, with regard to the

How, when we get into the accountant's money,

Checks written
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it through is Utah Mortgage Fund, plus numerous other
accounts. The fact is if the money was misappropriated,
it was misappropriated initially. Where they can trace
the money to over the next several months is immaterial,
and we will object to that. This is merely one account
of several that they have attempted to trace the monies
to and they have elaborate charts to show how they are
tracing those monies. But our position is that is not
appropriate.

It is not relevant.

It shouldn't be

allowed in as evidence.
In addition to that, the kinds of questions
counsel is now asking of this witness, the witness is
answering to the best of his ability but there was a lot
going on with Granada that did not involve the transfer
of funds from the Three Crowns Limited Partnership into
the Granada Interoffice Account.

Just didn't involve it

at all. And my fear is. this witness in trying to
testify honestly about the situation, is required to get
into things by virtue of the questions counsel asked.
When he asked specific leading questions that directed
his attention to one sort or another, then I didn't have
a problem.

But these general kinds of questions are

really a problem for us.
So we have an objection as to grounds of
relevancy in general and, secondly* an objection to the
116

specific questions as to the relevancy and to opening up
Information from the witness that Is not relevant for
this Jury to consider and Is prejudicial to my client.
I would suggest, Your Honor• that even if the
Court finds it has some probative value, whatever
probative value that it has, it is so limited that it is
over-shadowed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence.
And tinder Rule 403 this Court does have the discretion to
exclude it, and we would request as an additional ground
that it be excluded on that basis.
THE COURT: Mr. Griffin.
MR. GRIFFIN:
the bankruptcy.

Your Honor, it has relevance to

It has relevance to the defendant's

state of mind at the time and its absolute relevance to
intent.
You will recall that Merrill Rasmussen
testified that the defendant told him around the same
period of time that the money was being held at Citibank.
Well, Utah Mortgage Fund will be shown to be an account
at Citibank.

It is absolutely relevant, Your Honor. I

am trying to get into an area where we simply lead into
the negotiations of the filing of Utah Mortgage Fund.
I appreciate that Mr. Keller might want to
contend that, but that doesn't mean that the State's
theory is wrong and the State is entitled to present its
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1

I case.

2

I

3

I We have to remember, however, the charges involved.

4

I Really basically, the Nevada property and what went on

5

I here and we can't drift off into a lot of other things,

6

I except where it is purely relevant to the issues at hand.

7

I So I will admonish you to keep it that way, even if you

8

I have to ask some leading questions.

9

I that at the bench.

THE COURT:

I am going to allow you to proceed.

I think we discussed

I don't want these big broad

10

J questions. A preliminary —

11

I questions that are quite narrow, but we make sure we keep

12

I on the track so we don't get too far afield.

13

MR. GRIFFIN:

You can ask preliminary

That involves a substantial shift

14

I in my thinking, but I will try to do that with some

15

I latitude.

16

I

17

I tangent. We want to keep this within the issues of this

18

I particular case before the Court.

19

I

20

I Jury, his father is Judge Baldwin, right?

21

THE COURT:

I don't want us to go off on a

While we have Mr. Baldwin here without the

THE WITNESS: That is right.

22

I

THE COURT: And this was Judge Baldwin's

23

I courtroom for many, many, many years. My kids always get

24

I confused which courtroom I am in; but, John, I think you

25

I probably remember that. This was his courtroom.

I
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1

I thought that would add a little interest to all of us

2

I here. And not only that, I was in Ernest Baldwin's law

3

J firm for years before he went on the bench.

4

I we are ready to proceed and is there anything else you

5

I need to bring up?

6

MR. GRIFFIN:

But anyway,

Nothing else at this time, Your

7

J Honor.

B

I

THE COURT: Bring the dury back in.

9

I

The Jury has returned and we are ready to move

10

I ahead.

11

Q

12

You may ask your next question.
(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, are you familiar

I with the securities offering known as Utah Mortgage Fund?

13
14

(Pause)

I

15

A

Yes.

Q

How did you become familiar with Utah Mortgage

Fund?

16

I

17

I the sales of securities that were to go into that

IB

I offering.

19

I

20

A

Q

It was filed with our office in order to allow

Do you remember any of the specific features of

this offering?

21

I

A

It was Intended to do two things. To provide

22

J money for this large financial organization to be able to

23

I have the proceeds to continue to do business in their

24

I areas. And it was to provide disclosure to investors who

25

I had currently given money to various of the entities in
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order to give them a chance to take their money out if
they no longer wanted to stay involved in the operation,
given what we perceived to be disclosures that they would
not have otherwise had.

And to provide funds for them to

essentially get money back that they had once given.
Q

Were there questions about the ability of

Granada to repay?
A
that

It's my recollection at the time we were aware

~
MR. KELLER:

Objection.

The question can be

answered yes or no, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

It can be answered yes or no.

THE WITNESS: Please restate the question.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Were there questions with the

division about Granada's ability to repay former
investors?
A

Yes.

Q

Did the division attempt to resolve its

concerns in that regard?
A

Yes.

Q

How did the division attempt to resolve its

concerns in that regard?
A

We required In the offering that there be a

certain amount of cash.
Q

How much?
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A

Half a million dollars Is my recollection:

Q

That there be a certain amount of cash and I am

sorry, I cut you off to get the amount.
A

A certain amount of cash to go towards

resolving the cash needs of the people who would want to
get their money back.
Q

And how was that money to be held?

A

It was to be held In an escrow account to

satisfy the residual offers.
Q

Do you know If the defendant was connected with

this Utah Mortgage Fund?
A

It Is my recollection that his name appeared as

the filer of the documents.
Q

Mr. Baldwin, do you know If there ever was an

escrow of $500,000?
A

I don't know that.

Q

What happened to the Utah Mortgage Fund

offering that was filed with the division?
A

The offering was filed and It was never

approved for what we call "registration."
Q

So was Granada able to sell that offering to

Investors?
A

Well, the offering Itself was not approved by

the State to be sold to investors.
Q

Can you tell the Jury why it was not approved?
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MR. KELLER:

Objection.

Your Honor, again,

irrelevant and immaterial to the subject before the Court
at this time.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, after the Utah

Mortgage Fund was not approved by the Securities
Division, what further contacts, if any, did the division
have with Granada, Inc.?
A

We had contact with lawyers representing

Granada and the Utah Mortgage Fund and this family of
financial entities that we had involvement in. There
were numerous discussions with them in which time we
resolved that.

It was our opinion that the offering

would not go effective but could not go effective, and
essentially we indicated that to the lawyers representing
the companies.
Q

Were there contacts after that?

A

Yes, there were. We were approached by a

second group of lawyers on behalf of the financial
operations indicating a renewed willingness on their part
to reconcile the collection of money, the registration
and to work out what they had tried to work out over the
past few years.
Q

And were those subsequent conversations

successful at reaching some sort of amicable conclusion?
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A

No. We felt that given the time —
MR. KELLER:

Objection, the question has been

answered no. Your Honor.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Griffin) What happened after that?

What happened when the Securities Division couldn't reach
cm agreement with Granada?
A

We indicated ~

My understanding, Granada took

out bankruptcy.
MR. GRIFFIN:

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: You may cross examine.
MR. KELLER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. KELLER:
Q

Good afternoon, Mr. Baldwin.

A

Hi.

Q

Mr. Baldwin, were you present at a meeting in

early January of 1987 when several officers of Granada,
Including Mr. Larsen, were present?
A

I remember there was at least one meeting in

which several officers of Granada came to our offices. I
don't recall when that was, but it was in the course of
trying to negotiate the offering circular.
Q

Do you recall that at that meeting Mr. Larsen,

the defendant in this case, was present?
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